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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ON REGIONAL
FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS:
CORRUPTION OR COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT?
Teresa M. Cloutier*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress created the Regional Fishery Management
Councils under the Magnuson Act, it was felt that user groups
with an interest in the resource would act in a manner which
would protect that resource and ensure the future health of our
fisheries.... Now, rightly or wrongly, many people feel the
Councils and their members are acting unfairly. If this
perception of unfairness is correct, then Congress definitely
must take strong action to rectify this problem ... even if it
comes down to only a matter of perception.'
Congress, in enacting the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 (MFCMA),2 created a unique system for the
regional management and conservation of U.S. fishery resources.'
Central to this system are eight Regional Fishery Management Councils.
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1996.
1. Conflicts of Interest Within the Regional Fisheries Management Councils:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries Management of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1994) [hereinafter Conflict
Hearing] (statement of Rep. Thomas S. Manton, N.Y.).
2. MagnusonFishery, ConservationandManagementAct, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
(1994).
3. Sen. Ted Stevens, Alaska, commented in a 1993 hearing that it was "one of the
magnificent experiments of our National Government when we created these fishery
management councils ... because we delegated to those councils a portion of Federal
power and insisted that the States likewise accede part of their power to the individual
councils." Reauthorization of the MagnusonFishery Conservation and ManagementAct:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1993) [hereinafter August 1993 Hearing].
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Comprised of those most knowledgeable about and interested in the
fisheries, the Regional Councils promised to be an innovative solution to
the conservation of common fishery resources, potentially incorporating
the economies of cooperative management into the U.S. fisheries
management scheme.
However, upon implementation of the MFCMA, the problems facing
U.S. fisheries changed. Competition among U.S. fishermen replaced
concern over foreign fishing. The decisions of the Regional Councils
increasingly involved economic allocation. In addition, as the MFCMA
was amended over time, certain checks on Council power eroded. The
original Congressional delegation of authority to manage fisheries, once
carefully balanced between the Secretary of Commerce and the Councils,
became heavily concentrated in the Councils. The Regional Councils,
comprised of individuals making economic decisions about scarce
resources which could benefit them personally, with few checks on their
authority and little oversight, were viewed in a new light. The public
and user groups not represented on the Councils quickly noted the
conflicts of interest inherent in the system and denounced them as
improper. Many now perceive the Councils as corrupt. The subject has
been a matter of great debate, prompting numerous congressional
hearings. Legislative solutions are now before Congress.
Allegations that the interested Councils were making improper
management decisions peaked during the battle between the Alaskan
onshore processors and Washingtonian factory trawlers in the early
1990s.4 When the North Pacific Fishery Management Council decided
to allocate a percentage of the catch in certain fisheries to vessels serving
the onshore processors, the measure was decried as the "Shoreside
Preference Amendment" by the factory trawlers. Allegations of
improper and interested behavior by Council members were made and
eventually resulted in an investigation by the Inspector General into
Council behavior. In addition, a congressional hearing was held to look
into this investigation and to explore solutions to the Council conflict
dilemma.
This Comment will explore the problem now facing Congress and
will evaluate the proposed solutions now being debated in the two
Houses. Initially, the concept of cooperative management, one possible
theoretical justification for the existing Council system, will be discussed.
Next, the original management system put in place by the MFCMA will
4. See infra part III(C).
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be examined. This section will be followed by an explanation of how the
power structure behind that system has evolved over time. The problems
created by the present imbalance in the Council power structure will then
be illustrated by a case study of the allegations made regarding the
Council in the North Pacific. Finally, possible solutions to the problem,
contained in two bills currently before Congress, will be evaluated in
light of the potential of the MFCMA to create a system of cooperative
management of the nation's fisheries.
II. TBEORETIcAL BACKGROUND-CoOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT
OF COMMON FISHERY RESOURCES
As noted above, claims of corruption and conflict of interest
surround the fishing industry's involvement on the Regional Councils.
As a preface to discussion of these claims and of the legal framework for
the industry's participation, the following section presents some of the
theoretical arguments that might be put forth to justify giving resource
harvesters a direct role in regulating and conserving the resource.
A. The "Open Access" Problem
Fishery managers "have long perceived their role to be that of the
defenders of fish populations against depletion by harvesters." 5 Such
defense has been considered necessary to protect fisheries from economic
incentives to harvest, created by the nature of fisheries as a "common
good." "A common good is something of value that cannot be reduced
to private ownership, either because individual control is prohibited or
because it is prohibitively costly."6
5. R. Bruce Rettig et al., The Future of Fisheries Co-Management: A Multi-
Disciplinary Assessment, in COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT OF LOcAL FISHERIES: NEW
DIRECTIONS FORIMPROVEI) MANAGEMENT & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 273 (Evelyn
Pinkerton ed., 1989). The authors note that the most universally accepted goal of fishery
management is conservation. In fact, concern over the conservation of natural resources
has ancient roots demonstrated by various biblical teachings and "a critical comment by
Pliny the Elder on soil erosion in ancient Rome." Id.
6. RUSSEL L. BARSH, THE WASHINGTON FISHING RIGHTS CONTROVERSY: AN
ECONOMIC CRITIQUE 3-4 (1979). Barsh explains:
Consider a stock of fish that spends their entire lifetimes in the open ocean.
The cost of tagging fish to identify their owners while the fish feed and grow
would be astronomical. Even if fish could be tagged like cattle, the tags could
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The dilemma facing fishery managers attempting to conserve
common fish stocks is caused by the incentives of harvesters to deplete
the resource. Such incentives were most popularly explained in Garrett
Hardin's 1968 article about the "tragedy of the commons."' While
Hardin's phrase now represents the expected environmental degradation
of any scarce, common resource,' his conceptual framework can be
traced directly to an analysis of the "commons" problem in the fisheries
context. 9
Hardin's tragedy comes about in the following way. There is a
pasture, open to all. Rational herders, seeking to maximize their gain,
will engage in an economic analysis before adding cattle to the pasture.
Each herder will ask: "What is the utility to me of adding one more
animal to my herd?""0 The positive utility will consist of the benefit,
accruing solely to the individual herder, of adding one additional animal.
The negative utility will be the cost of the additional overgrazing caused
by one more animal. Born in part by all users of the common, the cost
will always be only a fraction of the benefit to any individual. The
incentive for the rational herder along with every other rational herder
will always be to add another animal to the commons. Each man is then
"locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit
-in a world that is limited," and thus, as Hardin concludes, "[r]uin is
be read only by removing the fish from the water, a process that would injure
or destroy many of them and necessitate the duplicative harvesting, release and
reharvesting of many fish.
... Under these circumstances, it obviously is unreasonable for individuals
to invest in producing fish for release into the ocean and later recapture on the
model of the nineteenth-century cattle industry. There would be no way of
preventing other persons from preying on the maturing fish, except by
prohibiting all marine fishing of that species.
Id.
7. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-
1248 (1968). One author notes that Hardin was not the first to describe the tragedy. For
example, Aristotle "long ago observed that 'what is common to the greatest number has
the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the
common interest.'" ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EvOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1990).
8. OSTROM, supra note 7, at 2.
9. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Properly Resource: The
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL.,
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 141 (1995).
10. Hardin, supra note 7, at 1244.
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the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.""
The phenomenon represented by Hardin's "tragedy of the commons"
has also been described by other theorists. It has been posed as a
"prisoner's dilemma"12 and has also been placed in other theoretical
frameworks. Models such as these have defined the accepted way of
viewing the problems which collective actors face.'
In the fisheries context, the "commons" phenomena is referred to as
the "open access" problem. Models, such as those described above,
have often been seen to establish the framework for dealing with this
problem. That the incentive to exploit, characteristic of these models,
will lead to overcapitalization and over-exploitation of the resource, tends
to be taken for granted by most resource economists and biologists.' 4 In
11. 1d. Hardin's model has attracted much interest due to the availability of the
model to describe varied problems such as the Sahelian famine of the 1970s, the
organization of the Mormon Church, and the inability of the U.S. Congress to limit its
capacity to overspend. OSTROM, supra note 7, at 3.
12. OsTRoM, supranote 7, at 3. The prisoner's dilemma modelproposes that there
are two strategic actors, who may not communicate while planning their strategy, but
who could choose to cooperate. If they both cooperate, they will both be better off. If
one defects, one will reap great rewards while the other will do much worse than if
cooperation had occurred. If they both defect, they will both receive something greater
than if one actor had cooperated and the other actor had defected, yet, something not as
great as if both actors had cooperated. Because the actors may not communicate and
wish to minirie their maximum loss, they will have incentive to defect. Therefore,
these individual actors will always both defect and reach a less than optimal outcome.
Id. at 3-5. See also AvINAsHD]xrr AND BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY:
THE COMPEITIVE EDGE iN BusINEss, PoLrrics, AND EVERYDAYLIFE 91 (1991) ("This
predicament is called the prisoners' dilemma. Its remarkable feature is that both sides
play their dominant strategy, thus maximize their payoff, and yet the outcome is jointly
worse than if both followed the strategy of minimizing their payoff.").
13. OSTROM, supra note 7, at 6.
The major obstacle facing such actors is known as the "free-rider" problem:
Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide,
each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride
on the efforts of others. If all participants choose to free-ride, the collective
benefit will not be produced. The temptation to free-ride, however, may
dominate the decision process, and thus all will end up where no one wanted
to be. Alternatively, some may provide while others free-ride, leading to less
than the optimal level of provision of the collective benefit.
Id.
14. Evelyn Pinkerton, Introduction: Attaining Better Fisheries Management
Through Co-Management-Prospects, Problems, and Propositions, in COOPERATIVE
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other words, these theorists believe that open access will lead to
depletion of the fisheries because fishermen are forced to compete against
each other for the same fish, not owning them until they are harvested.
The fishermen will, therefore, inevitably overinvest in competitive gear
and, in doing so, dissipate all potential profits.15
B. Theoretical Solutions
The policy prescriptions following from the dire assessments of
individual behavior described above have had an "equally grim
character." 6 Hardin, for example, asserts that, however society decides
to limit the use of common resources, 7 such a solution must be imposed
by a coercive, external force.18 This type of analysis has led to the
conclusion that central governments should control the management of
most natural resource systems.19 Others see privatization of the common
resource as the only way to save common resources. As noted by Elinor
Ostrom, a leading critic of such exclusive prescriptions: "Both the
economic analysis of common property resources and Hardin's treatment
of the tragedy of the commons [lead to the conclusion] that the only way
to avoid the tragedy of the commons in natural resources and wildlife is
to end the common-property system .... 20
Ostrom has argued that there are no exclusive solutions to the
problems surrounding common resource management. She notes that
both centralization advocates and privatization advocates presume that
"optimal institutional solutions can be designed easily and imposed at low
cost by external authorities."21 Questioning the approaches of the above
models, Ostrom argues that "'getting the institutions right' is a difficult,
MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL FISHERIES: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR IMPROVED MANAGEMENT &
COMMUNrTY DEVELOPMENT 3, 13 (Evelyn Pinkerton ed., 1989).
15. Id. at 19.
16. OSTROM, supra note 7, at 8.
17. Some of Hardin's suggestions include privatization of common resources, the
retention of the commons as public property while allocating use rights, and the use of
taxing devices. Hardin, supra note 7.
18. OSTROM, supra note 7, at 9.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 12 (quoting Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by
Creating Private Properly Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439-468 (1981)) [emphasis in
original].
21. OSTROM, supra note 7, at 14.
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time-consuming, conflict-invoking process.'
The danger in designing policy solutions using models, such as those
described above, lies in the fact that those models make many assump-
tions about the world which may not accurately reflect real-world
circumstances. The constraints on the actors in the models which are
"assumed to be fixed for the purpose of analysis are taken on faith as
being fixed in empirical settings, unless external authorities change
them. "2 By using these models by analogy to describe actual behavior,
observers frequently depict common resource users as helpless individu-
als compelled by circumstance to deplete the resource.'
Yet, "[n]ot all users of natural resources are similarly incapable of
changing their constraints. "' "The perception of the fisherman as both
the victim and the villain of the relentless Greek tragedy of the
commons" has been discarded by those who "know that fishermen are
often able to act in ways that help solve an impending problem."2
Overfishing and overcapitalization are not inevitable in the fisheries
context in the absence of a coercive, external force or privatization.
There are many institutional arrangements which govern the exploitation
of open access resources which are favorable to conservation, and few
are purely public or purely private.27 Many institutions which allow
individuals to "achieve productive outcomes in situations where
temptations to free ride and shirk are ever present" are a mixture of
"public-like" and "private-like" components.'
C. Cooperative Management
Such public/private institutions include what are referred to as
cooperative management systems. These systems "set up a game in
which the payoffs are greater for cooperation than for opposition and/or
competition, a game in which the actors can learn to optimize their
22. Id.
23. OSTRoM, supra note 7, at 6.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 7. Ostrom is careful to note that the traditional "commons" models are
not wrong when the assumptions behind them approximate real world conditions. They
are, rather, "special models that utilize extreme assumptions rather than general
theories." Id. at 183.
26. Rettig et al., supra note 5, at 285.
27. OSTROM, supra note 7, at 15.
28. Id.
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mutual good and plan co-operatively with long-term horizons."29 In
public policy terms, these systems represent "appropriate institutional
arrangements [which] change the legal structure of incentives and
deterrents and allow a community of users to reduce the costs of sharing
a common resource, while capturing the benefits which can accrue to
wise collective users."' In these situations, a balance of power is
created so that fishermen do not feel coerced, yet, government is still
present and may "act as a check to any local violations which do not
conserve fish stocks or fairly share the benefits of fish production.""'
Usually, cooperative fisheries management results in more appropriate,
efficient or equitable management than that achieved under centralized
control32 or privatized market action.33
Cooperative fishery management agreements between public and
private actors are not yet common. Their development is usually
prompted by worsening problems such as a crisis caused by rumored or
real stock depletion or claims that government's ability to manage the
resource is insufficient. However, the creation of these agreements is
conducive to the development of the most promising policy solutions to
the problems which prompted them.3' This is due to "the potential of
co-management agreements to promote conservation and enhancement of
fish stocks, to improve the quality of data and data analysis, to reduce
29. Pinkerton, supra note 14, at 5.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 4. Such a balance of power tempers common perceptions of both
fishermen/users and government managers. Government officials often see fishermen
as predators prone to destroy the resource without regulation. Fishermen, who have lost
faith in the government's ability to solve management problems, point to the
government's lack of adequate data and to its tendency to make problems worse through
intervention. Id.
32. Id. at 5.
33. A privatized market solution would be extremely difficult to implement in the
case of fisheries. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. As Ostrom notes:
mhe "'tragedy of the commons' has proved particularly difficult to counteract
in the context of marine fishery resources where the establishment of individual
property rights is virtually out of the question. . . . [E]ven when particular
rights are utilized, quantified, and salable, the resource system is still likely to
be owned in common rather than individually .... [C]ommon ownership is
the fundamental fact affecting almost every regime of fishery management."
See OSTROM, supra note 7, at 13 (quoting Colin Clark, Restricted Access to Common-
Property Fishery Resources:A Game-Theoretic Analysis, in DYNAMIC OPTMIZATION AND
MATHEMATICALECONOMICS 117 (P.T. Liu ed., 1980)).
34. Pinkerton, supra note 14, at 4.
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excessive investments by fishermen in competitive gear, to make
allocation of fishing opportunities more equitable, to promote community
economic development, and to reduce conflict between government and
fishermen, and conflict among fishermen's groups."3"
Not all cooperative management schemes are "complete" co-
management systems. In "incomplete" systems, not all decisions which
could be shared by public and private actors are so shared." However,
co-management in the performance of certain, isolated management
functions has been seen to improve such functions.7 For example, co-
management of habitat enhancement has increased the benefit of that
enhancement at a relatively low cost:
The accomplishments of co-management regimes in which
government and users have shared power and responsibility in
enhancement or long-range stock recovery planning and habitat
protection are especially notable in producing superior and more
efficient management. This is accomplished chiefly by linking
the efforts of fishermen as local resource users to the interests
of fishermen as long-term users of local habitats and/or residents
35. Id.
36. Co-management arrangements take various shapes and forms. These variations
include:
[D]ifferences in the parties involved (tribes, sport, commercial, academics),
differences in the formality or legality of arrangements or agreements (court-
ordered, legislated, claims agreement, locally specific, short-term, ad-hoc),
differences in the scale of group covered by the arrangement (local, regional,
state-wide), differences in the basis for the organization of the group (local
watershed or community, regional ethnic organization, regional licensing
category, labour union, gear type association), differences inthe species being
managed (Pacific salmon, lobster, clams, marine mammals, lake trout, etc.),
and differences in the management function undertaken by the fishing group
(complete self-regulation or a narrower function).
Id. atx.
37. Pinkerton has broken management functions into seven categories: (1) data
gathering and analysis; (2) logical harvesting decisions; (3) harvest allocation decisions;
(4) protection of habitat and water quality; (5) enforcement; (6) enhancement and long-
term planning; and (7) broad policy decision-making. Id. at 6.
110 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:101
of a local area in which they have particular fishing interests? 8
Schemes allowing for co-management have also resulted in improved
data collection and cooperation with enforcement measures. The high
costs commonly associated with these aspects of management can be
traced to policies derived from early economic and biological models
which were based on a set of naive assumptions which made these
models unsuitable for effective management.39 Biological models were
based on the concept of maximum sustainable yield. It was presumed
that populations below carrying capacity generated a certain harvestable
surplus4" to be determined through data collection. Economic models,
as described above, posited that fishermen could only be restrained from
exceeding the maximum sustainable yield by the imposition of restric-
tions by a coercive, outside actor.41
These models, however, failed to recognize the costs of the data
collection needed to inform the biological model and the enforcement
costs involved with the economic model. Determining stock size and
developing other biological information is extremely costly. Administra-
tion and enforcement of management measures is also costly, especially
when fishermen view managers as those who do not sympathize with or
understand their views.42 In addition, centrally-gathered data, costly as
38. Id. at 12. Pinkerton notes certain factors in the success of these co-
management schemes. The willingness of the fishermen to contribute financially to
management affected the success of their efforts to share management authority with
government. This willingness was much stronger when their contributions resulted in
the right to co-manage on a regional or watershed basis. Such co-management allowed
the fishermen to reap the benefits given. Regional or watershed co-management not only
provides incentives for fishermen to contribute, but has a sound biological basis and,
arguably, cannot be effectively carried out without the contribution of fishermen. Id. at
7-10.
For sound, long-term management benefits to be realized, fishermen may need
to be involved on a regional and local basis in the location, size, and species
of enhancement .... Fishermen may be the only actors who will demand that
smaller stocks be protected and/or enhanced because of their long-term
importance to local areas, even though in the short term exclusive enhancement
of the larger stocks may appear more efficient.
Id. at 10-11.
39. Rettig et al., supra note 5, at 283.
40. Id. at 274.
41. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
42. Pinkerton, supra note 14, at 13.
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it is to gather, arguably increases the costs of enforcement. This is so
because government management decisions based on such data:
tend to have low credibility with fishermen who have alternative
sources of data and often more extensive knowledge of local
stocks based on years of observation. . . . When fishermen's
livelihoods are severely disrupted by decisions based on data
they know to be inadequate, they tend to adopt confrontational
postures, practise civil disobedience, or engage in outright
sabotage.43
Such costly outcomes can largely be avoided by properly bringing
fishermen into the data-gathering and analysis process."
One example of an arrangement which is thought to have achieved
many of the above described efficiencies is a cooperative system devised
by inshore fishermen in Alanya, Turkey.' Faced with intense conflict
over the use of the resource, increased production costs resulting from
competition, and uncertainty regarding any one potential harvest,
members of a local cooperative have devised a system for allotting
fishing sites to local fishers.4 ' First, two lists are created. One is of
eligible fishers, the other is of all usable fishing locations. At the
beginning of the fishing season, the eligible fishers draw lots and are
assigned to the various locations. Over the course of the season, the
fishermen rotate in such a manner as to give each an equal chance to fish
at the prime spots.4
This system has succeeded in avoiding several of the problems
associated with the management of common resources. The first is
overcapitalization. The allotment spaces the fishers so that production
at each site is optimized, yet, resources do not have to be wasted
searching for or fighting over a site since all fishers have an equal
chance at each spot. This factor, observes Ostrom, seems to have
resulted in a fishery with no apparent signs of overcapitalization. s
43. Pinkerton, supra note 14, at 13. The author notes, however, that the most
successful co-management occurs when neither government nor fishermen's groups have
exclusive control over data gathering and analysis.
44. Id.
45. OSTROM, supra note 7, at 18-19.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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In addition, the data gathering needed to solve the resource
management dilemma in Alanya is facilitated by the cooperative
arrangement. As observed by Ostrom, "[c]entral-government officials
could not have crafted [the cooperative's] rules without assigning a full-
time staff to work (actually fish) in the area for an extended period. ""
The fishing areas involved would have been impossible to map and
divide fairly without the "extensive on-site experience"' brought to the
task by the resource users.
Finally, the cooperative nature of the system in Alanya results in
relative ease in monitoring and enforcement." These functions are
performed by the fishermen themselves. Each fisher entitled to a certain
spot on any given day is in place to observe and deal with any cheating
on the cooperative arrangement. The rights of that individual are
reinforced by the others in the system who all have incentive to insure
similar protection for themselves in the future. 2 Aiding such enforce-
ment is the fact that rights to the resource and corresponding duties are
well-defined. 3 In turn, these rights and duties are legitimized by the fact
that national legislation gives the cooperatives jurisdiction over such local
arrangements and that local officials sign the cooperative agreement each
year.'
Elinor Ostrom has distilled, through analyzing certain long-enduring
systems, eight "design principles" which characterize successful
cooperative management arrangements. 5 First, the users who may
withdraw resources from the common pool being managed are clearly
defined in these systems.56 Second, appropriation and provision rules
governing the resource are appropriate, given local conditions and
needs.57 Third, most individuals affected by the operational rules of
management participate in modifying those rules.5 Fourth, those who
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 20 ("The few infractions that have occurred have been handled easily by
the fishers at the local coffeehouse.")
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 89-90. For an alternative framework, see Pinkerton, supra note 14, at
26-31.
56. Id. at 91.
57. Id. at 92.
58. Id. at 93.
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monitor user behavior are accountable to the users or are the users
themselves. 59  Fifth, sanctions for violating management rules are
graduated, according to the seriousness of the offence, and are assessed
by officials who are users, who are accountable to the users, or both.'
Sixth, users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local
mechanisms to resolve conflicts. 61 Seventh, the rights of the appropria-
tors to devise their own institutions is not challenged by external
governmental authorities.' Finally, characteristic of more complex
systems, appropriation, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested
enterprises. This includes the creation of local, regional, and national
managers where appropriate.'
In conclusion, cooperative management systems seem to provide an
alternative to resource management based solely on privatization of the
resource or on coercive regulation by an outside actor. The Regional
Councils created by the MFCMA, comprised as they are of resource
-users, may potentially be justified as an attempt to incorporate the
efficiencies associated with cooperative management into U.S. fisheries
management. The validity of such a justification will be explored below.
However, first, the next few sections will explore how the Regional
Councils were designed to function and, how the system which has
evolved under the MFCMA has led to claims that a skewed balance of
public and private power on the Councils has undermined their legiti-
macy as management bodies.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL SYSTEM
A. The Origins of the System
Before 1976, "freedom of fishing was the rule [governing U.S.
offshore fisheries] beyond the narrow ... three-mile territorial sea and
adjacent nine-mile contiguous zone. " ' This freedom, along with
59. Id. at 94.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 100.
62. Id. at 101.
63. Id. at 101-102.
64. Eldon V.C. Greenberg & Michael E. Shapiro, Federalism in the Fishery
Conservation Zone: A New Role for the States in an Era of Federal Regulatory Reform,
55 S. CAL. L. REv. 641 (1982). The three-mile zone was under the jurisdiction of the
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the large, efficient and subsidized fleets of other nations which existed
by the 1970s,' resulted in a foreign fishing effort which came to be
perceived as a threat to both the U.S. fishing industry and the resource
itself. For example, in 1975, foreign fishermen took 6.4 billion pounds
of the 7 billion pound catch from the waters 12-200 miles off the U.S.
coast.' This foreign fishing effort was noted as the primary cause of the
serious depletion of many coastal species at the time.'
Concern over such foreign fishing was a major impetus for the
MFCMA. The main purpose of the act was to extend the "exclusive
fishery management" zone of the United States from 12 to 200 miles
offshore.' The proponents of the MFCMA felt that any such extension
of jurisdiction which might result from the Law of the Sea Treaty, being
negotiated at the time, would not go into effect soon enough to save U.S.
offshore fisheries.69 The need for protective measures in the interim
states. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1994). See generally Arthur
J. Tassi, Note, Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: An Accommodation
of State, Federal, and International Interests, 10 CAsEW. RES. J. INT'L L. 703, 704 n.5
(1978). The federal role in fishery management was virtually non-existent, even though
the federal government possessed broad powers to regulate fisheries under the
Constitution. Greenberg & Shapiro, supra, at 645 (federal power to regulate interstate
and international commerce under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 as well as the power to
make treaties given under U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). Any fishery regulation which
took place in waters beyond the territorial sea was conducted by the states pursuant to
their police powers, and subject to certain constitutional restrictions. John Winn,
Comment, Alaska v. F/V Baranof: State Regulation Beyond the Territorial Sea After the
Magnuson Act, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 281, 282 (1986).
65. H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 43-44 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 607-608, 611-612.
66. COMMrIrEE ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT Acr op 1976 263 (Comm. Print
1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MFCMA] (statement of Sen. Ernest F.
Hollings, S.C.).
According to NMFS data at the time of the passage of the MFCMA, sixteen species
were overfished. These species were: yellowfm sole, Alaska pollock, Pacific ocean
perch, Pacific halibut, Atlantic halibut, Bering Sea herring, Bering Sea shrimp, haddock,
yellowtail flounder, California sardine, Pacific mackerel, Atlantic sea scallop, Northwest
Atlantic shrimp, and Atlantic bluefin tuna. Six of these species were depleted by U.S.
fisheries, seven by foreign fisheries and one by both. Id. at 359.
67. Id. at 263.
68. H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 65, at 22, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
594. See 16 U.S.C. § 1811-1812 (1994).
69.
mhe international community does appear ready to adopt a 200-mile limit.
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was stressed.7" In addition, although international agreements regarding
fishing existed, these existing agreements were seen as insufficient to
save the fish71 and the negotiation of another, adequate international
The real question is when. Beginning now, it is quite possible that distant
water fishing nations which have made large investments in technologically
advanced and large fleets will become very uncertain about future access to a
coastal nation's 200-mile zone. Consequently, it is possible that such nations
will step up their efforts to capture fish on the high seas as long as the limits
remain narrow. The Committee [on Merchant Marine and Fisheries] is quite
concerned about the effect of delay in the implementation, ratification and
effective date of any new convention that may be negotiated in the Law of the
Sea Conference which will most likely contain a 200-mile fishery limit
provision.
H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 65, at 28-29, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 601;
see also 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (1994).
70. In the words of Senator Mark 0. Hatfield, Or.:
This bill will protect our resources until such time as an effective treaty can be
negotiated. I hope one is, and I hope passage of the legislation will expedite
negotiations at the [Law of the Sea] conference. . . . But we cannot wait
forever. . . . Not only is there absolutely no certainty that a treaty can be
drafted at the next conference session, there is also the matter of ratification,
which will take some time .... we cannot wait that long.
LEGsLATivE H_. ToRYMFCMA, supra note 66, at 259. See also H.R. REP. No. 445,
supra note 65, at 22, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 594-595 (H.R. 200 meant to
extend U.S. jurisdiction over fishery resources from 12 to 200 miles offshore in the
period until general agreement on fisheries jurisdiction was reached in the U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea and such agreement came into force and effect for the
U.S.).
71. According to the House Report accompanying the bill:
Presently, the United States is party to well over a score of international fishing
agreements and periodically engages in bilateral and multilateral negotiations
with foreign nations to restructure these treaties and to frame new ones which
seek to conserve fish resources. Nearly all of the stocks of fish considered to
be depleted or threatened with depletion are subject to these international
agreements....
H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 65, at 42, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 610. See
also LEGISLATIVE HisToRYMFCMA, supra note 66, at 263 (statement of Sen. Hollings)
(despite international agreement governing the area, "overfishing by foreign fleets in the
Northeast is continuing at an embarrassing rate").
At the suggestion that H.R. 200 be amended to provide for negotiation under article
7 of the Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas before assertion of the 200 mile zone, Sen. Warren G. Magnuson, Wash.,
stated:
None of the people we are talking about that violate our shores are parties to
this agreement, and they are not going to be parties to it. Japan is not going
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agreement was considered out of reach. 2
Although the main purpose of the MFCMA was to limit foreign
fishing, Congress also recognized that once the United States had
jurisdiction over the newly extended fishery zone, now called the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),73 "[it was] going to have a conserva-
tion problem and [was] going to have to set some standards so [Ameri-
can] fishermen [did] not overfish."74 Thus, the MFCMA also created a
National Fishery Management Program 5 centered around a system of
Regional Fishery Management Councils.76 This program was premised
on the conclusion "that fishery resources must be conserved and
managed in such a way as to assure that an optimum supply of food and
other fish products, and that recreational opportunities involving fishing,
are available on a continuing basis and that irreversible or long-term
adverse effects on fishery resources are minimized."'7
to sign this. Russia is not going to sign this, if we revive this whole dead
horse. . . [and] [tlhe 1958 convention, of course, is only binding on ratifying
nations, none of whom fish off our shores.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MFCMA, supra note 66, at 312. But see, id. at 316 (telegram
from Arthur Dean saying that the 1958 treaty reflects customary international law).
72. As stated by Sen. John 0. Pastore, R.I.:
We want an international agreement. We have been trying to get an international
agreement. But the trouble is that those who are invading our waters, destroying
our pots, cleaning up our fish, do not want an agreement .... We want to give
them a fair share. But we want our fisheries to come under some management,
some kind of orderly control.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MFCMA, supra note 66, at 237-238.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(6) (1994). When created, this zone was called the "fishery
conservation zone." See Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-265, § 101, 90 Stat. 331, 336 (1976) (amended 1986). The MFCMA was
amended in 1986 and the zone was renamed the "exclusive economic zone." Pub. L.
No. 99-659, see. 101, § 1811, 100 Stat. 3706, 3707 (1986). This amendment partially
implemented President Reagan's 1983 Exclusive Economic Zone Proclamation.
Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983).
74. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MFCMA, supra note 66, at 240-241 (statement by Sen.
Packwood).
75. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1851-1861 (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
1851-1861 (1994)).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1852
(1994)).
77. S. CoNF. REP. No. 711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 690, 663; see also William R. Rogalski, Note, The Unique Federalism
of the Regional Councils Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 163, 169-170 (1980) (discussing the legislative purposes
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The MFCMA created a "two-tiered decision-making mechanism" for
management and conservation decisions which "called for basic policy
determinations such as optimum yield and management strategies to rest
with the Councils while review and rulemaking authority vested in the
Secretary [of Commerce]."71 The main function of each Council was
originally, and continues to be, to prepare and submit to the Secretary of
Commerce a fishery management plan (FMP) with respect to each
fishery within its geographical area of authority.79 These FMPs are to
"achieve and maintain, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from
each fishery."' They are also to be consistent with the other "national
standards" for fishery management set out in the MFCMA. s'
Originally, however, the Councils' involvement in implementing these
plans was quite limited. First, the Secretary was given the right to
approve or disapprove all FMPs. Upon receipt of a fishery management
plan as developed by a Council, the Secretary was to review the plan, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Coast Guard, and to
determine its consistency with the MFCMA's national standards as well
as with other applicable law.' The Secretary was then to notify the
of the MFCMA).
78. Rogalski, supra note 77, at 171-172. See also H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note
65, at 24, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 596 (Councils only meant to assist
Secretary inregulating fisheries); LEGIsLATvEHIsToRYMFCMA, supranote 66, at492
(statement of Sen. Ted Stevens, Alaska, that Councils "recommend regulations" to the
Secretary of Commerce).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1852(h)(1) (1994).
Theoretically, it is no longer the case that every U.S. fishery must be managed by
an FMP. Each Regional Council was originally mandated by the MFCMA to develop
an FMP for each fishery within its jurisdiction. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1) (1976) (current
version as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1) (1994). However, section 1852 was
amended in 1983 to require the Councils to create FMPs for only those species which
require conservation and management. See Pub. L. No. 97-453, see. 5(4), § 1852(h)(1),
96 Stat. 2481, 2484 (1983).
The Secretary may only prepare an independent FMEP where 1) the governing
Council fails to develop and submit a plan or necessary amendment within a reasonable
period of time, or 2) the Secretary disapproved a submitted plan or amendment and the
Council involved fails to resubmit a revised version. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1) (1994).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(4) (1994).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (1994).
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1854(b) (1994)).
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relevant Council of either the approval or disapproval of the plan." In
the case of disapproval or partial disapproval of the plan, the Secretary
was to return the plan, with an explanation, to the Council and request
the Council to resubmit a modified plan within forty-five days."
In addition, all regulatory power rested, and continues to rest solely
with the Secretary.' The Councils could prepare any proposed
regulations deemed "necessary and appropriate" to carry out their
FMPs.86 However, they were given no authority to promulgate those
regulations. The Councils could only submit them "for action by the
Secretary. "I
The Regional Councils were designed to include both voting and
nonvoting members. The voting members of the Councils are: (1) the
principal State official with marine fishery management responsibility in
each constituent State; (2) the regional director of the National Marine
Fisheries Service for the geographic area concerned; and (3) certain
members to be appointed by the Secretary from a list of individuals
nominated by the Governor of each State who are knowledgeable with
regard to the management, conservation, or recreational harvest of the
relevant fisheries." The nonvoting members include: (1) the regional or
area director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service for the
geographical area concerned; (2) the commander of the relevant Coast
Guard district; (3) the executive director of the Marine Fisheries
Commission of the concerned area, if any; and (4) a representative of the
State Department. 9
The nonvoting members of the council play an advisory role.'
However, since Council decisions were, and still are, made by a majority
of the voting members,91 "the composition of the voting group directly
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1854(a) (1994)).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (1976)(current versionas amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)
(1994)).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1855 (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1855
(1994)).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(c) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
18543(c) (1994)).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(c) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1853(c) (1994)).
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b) (1994).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(c) (1994).
90. Rogalski, supra note 77, at 173 n.55.
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(e)(1) (1994).
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determines the policy shaped by the councils."92 This composition
"shows a strong state representation among those voting on the plans."I
In addition, the majority of the voting group of each Council is
comprised of those appointed individuals "knowledgeable regarding the
conservation and management, or the commercial recreational harvest,
of the fishery resources" of the relevant area. 4
Affording these individuals such a strong voice on the Councils was
seen as a way to allow those interested in the fisheries to contribute to
the decision-making process.95 It'was felt that recreational and
commercial fishermen, "with an interest in the resource would act in a
manner which would protect that resource and ensure the future health
of our fisheries. "I Congress believed that "this institutional arrangement
[was] the best hope [the United States could] have of obtaining fishery
management decisions which in fact protect the fish and which, at the
same time, have the support of the fishermen who are regulated. "' Such
justifications for creating the Regional Council system indicate that it was
created as an "appropriate institutional arrangement" designed to "change
the legal structure of incentives and deterrents" thought to plague the
management of common fisheries and to "allow a community of users to
reduce the costs of sharing a common resource, while capturing the
benefits which can accrue to wise collective users."' The policy
92. Rogalski, supra note 77, at 172.
93. Id. at 173.
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(A) (1994). Of the 17 voting members on the New
England Council, I Iare appointed according to 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2); of the 19 voting
members on the Mid-Atlantic Council, 12 are so appointed; of the 13 voting members
on the South Atlantic Council, 8 are so appointed; of the 7 voting members on the
Caribbean Council, 4 are so appointed; of the 17 voting members on the Gulf Council,
11 are so appointed; of the 13 members on the Pacific Council, 8 are so appointed; of
the 11 voting members on the North Pacific Council, 7 are so appointed (5 from Alaska
and 2 from Washington); and of the 13 voting members of the Western Pacific Council,
8 are so appointed. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a) (1994).
95. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1801(b)(5) (1994) (purpose of Councils is to "enable the . . . fishing industry,
consumer and environmental organizations, and other interested parties to participate in,
and advise on" the establishment of FMPs).
96. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Rep.Thomas J. Manton,
N.Y.).
97. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MFCMA, supra note 66, at 455 (Sen. Warren G.
Magnuson, Wash.).
98. Pinkerton, supra note 14, at 5. See also supra text accompanying note 30
(discussing cooperative management systems generally).
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justification for the make-up of the Councils, thus, seems to rest upon
principles of cooperative management.
This Congressional decision to allow interested individuals on the
Councils may be explained by evidence in the legislative history that the
Regional Fishery Management Councils were not originally designed to
bear responsibility for economic allocation. In the words of Senator Ted
Stevens (Alaska), the MFCMA was meant to:
[S]et up a mechanism by which the people of the region affected
can select those whom they think are capable of managing their
fisheries. Those managers will comprise the regional council
which will hire the experts,' utilize the resources of the Federal
Government and the affected State governments, and determine
what the optimum yield of a particular species should be.
• . . [W]e are not talking about an economic matter. We are
talking about a limit on the taking of those species when it is
necessary from a biological point of view for their protection.
We are talking only about conservation and . . . protection.1"
In another instance, the Senator emphasized his position by stating that
"[i]n effect, I am saying that a regional council could not, for example,
say that only vessels over a certain size can fish for one species, and
only those under another size for another species. We have no intention
to permit the regional council to have economic authority over fisheries
resources. They are to have conservation and environmental authority,
but not economic. "101 Therefore, while the original Act did allow FMPs
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (g) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1852(g) (1994)) (each Council to establish and maintain a scientific and statistical
committee and other such advisory panels as necessary or appropriate).
100. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MFCMA, supra note 66, at 368.
101. Id. at 345.
This focus on conservation may have stemmed from the fact that, at the time the
MFCMA was passed, fishery management centered around the concept of maximum
sustainable yield. See Rettig et al., supra note 5, at 274; see also 16 U.S.C. §
1801(b)(4) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(4) (1994))
(purpose of MFCMA is to provide for fishery management plans "which will achieve and
maintain, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery"); 16 U.S.C. §
1802(18) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1802(21) (1994)) (optimum
yield prescribed on the basis of maximum sustainable yield as modified by relevant
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to include allocation measures if necessary,' limits on Council authority
such as Secretarial review and exclusive Secretarial rulemaking seem to
have minimized concern over Council participation in the allocation
process.
B. Shifting Focus, Eroding Safeguards
The Magnuson Act succeeded in reducing foreign fishing off the
coast of the United States. The foreign catch in the EEZ for 1991 was
insignificant and, in 1992, there were no foreign operations in the
EEZ. 103 However, as noted by one observer in 1990:
[T]he new law transformed the U.S. fishing industry so rapidly
that its conservation objective has not kept pace with the
dramatic growth in capital investments .... In the past five
years, since the Magnuson Act made a clean sweep of foreign-
flagged vessels, a new class of boats and at-sea processors,
worth more than $1 billion, has crowded into the Bering Sea and
the Gulf of Alaska. Overcapitalization has led to ferocious
infighting among American trawlers, crabbers, shore-based
economic, social, or ecological factors). Most believed that, if fish harvests could just
be kept below the surplus production for any given stock size, the harvest would be
within sustainable limits. Rettig et al., supra note 5, at 274; see also 16 U.S.C. §
1801(a)(5) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(5) (1994)) ("If
placed under sound management before overfishing has caused irreversible effects, the
fisheries can be conserved and maintained so as to provide optimum yields on a
continuing basis."). The problem of economically driven overfishing was overlooked by
many fishery managers initially. Rettig et al., supra note 5, at 274. This naivete
characterized the initial debates concerning the MFCMA. Referring to the Council
system and national standards calling for the maintenance of an "optimum yield" from
the fishery, one senator noted: "There seems to be universal agreement that the
management sections of the bill will provide the mechanisms we need to restore our
fisheries to desirable levels and maintain them for the future." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
MFCMA, supra note 66, at 331 (statement of Sen. Michael Gravel, Alaska).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(6) (1976) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1853(b)(6) (1994)); 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4) (1976) (current version as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4) (1994)) (any necessary allocation shall be fair and equitable).
103. Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1993) [hereinafter Senate Hearings 1993] (statement of Douglas K.
Hall, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration).
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processors, and floating factories over the finite harvestable
stock. Parochial struggles between these ballooning user groups
over ever shrinking slices of the fisheries pie have become the
most pressing management within the industry."°4
As competition between American users has increased, the line
between resource allocation and conservation is no longer easily drawn.
"Allocation decisions granting a specific share of total harvest to a
particular category of fishermen have become an increasingly common
mode of resource management by the Councils."105 It is no longer
possible to say that the Councils are to have conservation and environ-
mental authority, but not economic authority. Fishery management plans
must define the "optimum yield" of each fishery.' "Optimum" is
defined as that "which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum
sustainable yield from such fishery, as modified by any relevant
economic, social, or ecological factor. " " The plans must mix science
with politics and social circumstances. The Councils must seek to
conserve, to satisfy the economic needs of the fishermen, and to protect
consumers."° Because of this, management decisions are often driven
by industry needs for economic development opportunities."°  Social
104. Karen Franklin, Alaskan Fisheries: The Battle Between Conservation and
Resource Allocation, PAC. Nw EXECUTIVE, April 1, 1990, at 3, 3.
105. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Rep. Maria Cantwell,
Wash.).
The allocative aspects of Council decision-making have been most striking in those
fisheries utilizing Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems. An ITQ is an "allocated
privilege of landing a specified portion of the total annual fish catch in the form of quota
shares." Eugene H. Buck, Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management,
Congressional Research Service, Summary (September 25, 1995). These shares must be
allocated initially among users according to criteria developed by the relevant Regional
Councils. Currently, three Federal ITQ programs operate in U.S. waters. See 50
C.F.R. § 652.20-652.21 (1995) (Atlantic surf clamand oceanquahog fishery); 50 C.F.R.
§ 646.10 (1995) (South Atlantic wreckfish fishery); 50 C.F.R. § 676.10-676.14, §
676.20-676.23 (1995) (Pacific halibut/sablefish fishery).
106. It is important to note here the difference between the concept of maximum
sustainable yield and the concept of optimum yield. Maximum sustainable yield is
simply a biological concept, focused on determining the surplus production (i.e.
allowable harvest) of a certain stock size. The yield determined for the Magnuson Act
is the "optimum" yield. 16 U.S.C. § 1802 (1994).
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1802 (1994).
108. Franklin, supra note 104, at 3.
109. Id. at 4.
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concerns, difficult to quantify, are often left to the discretion of fishery
managers. 10 Because Councils containing industry representatives must
exercise discretion in making such management decisions and because
their decisions are viewed as "driven by their bottom line,""' the
Councils have come to be viewed by some as corrupt and conflicted.
Many critics of the Council system note the erosion of certain
safeguards against the improper use of Council power originally in place
in 1976.11 The first to erode was the line drawn by the MFCMA
between the policy-making role of the Councils and the law-making role
of the Secretary. As described by a representative of the Southeastern
Fisheries Association, the original system:
[put the interested members of the Councils] in a "big box" in
order for them to dynamically discuss and debate fisheries
issues.... The one constant control of this system was [that]
the Council members couldn't get out of the box.
. . . Under the original concept, it didn't matter if a boat
captain or processor or marina operator or pleasure boat
manufacturer served on the Council because the product of the
collective work was to be an FMP RECOMMENDATION to
the Secretary of Commerce who has legal responsibility to
determine if the RECOMMENDED FMP was legal. After such
a determination the Secretary would write and publish the
regulations." 3
Upon reauthorization of the MFCMA in 1983, this system was
altered. It was felt by some that a "false dichotomy between plan
development and regulation development" was created by the fact that
the rulemaking process could only take place after an FMP was
approved." Therefore, Congress amended § 1853 of the Act to require
Councils to promulgate regulations and submit them along with any
110. Rettig et al, supra note 5, at 275-276.
111. Franklin, supra note 104, at 3.
112. See, e.g., Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 90, 99 (statements by
Southeastern Fisheries Association and Marine Fish Conservation Network).
113. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 91 (emphasis in original).
114. S. REP. No. 519, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4320, 4357.
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FMP."' Before the amendment, such promulgation was permitted but
not required.
In addition, there was concern over Secretarial delay in reviewing
FMPs. 16  In response to this concern, explicit criteria for Secretarial
review were created by Congress." 7 First, the Secretary, upon the
simultaneous receipt of the FMP and accompanying regulations from the
relevant Council, was required by a 1983 amendment to immediately
publish the plan in the Federal Register and request comments. This step
was altered in 1986 by another amendment requiring the Secretary to
immediately conduct a preliminary evaluation of the FMP and regulations
and, upon initial approval, to begin the review process by publishing the
proposed plan."' Initial disapproval immediately sends the plan back to
the Council for revision. 19
Following the close of a 60-day comment period,"2 the Secretary is
required to complete the review of the FMP and the public comments,
participate in necessary consultations with the Secretary of State
regarding foreign fishing and participate in consultations with the Coast
115. Pub. L. No. 97-453, sec. 6(2), § 1953(c), 96 Stat. 2481, 2486-2487 (1982).
116. In 1978, 1979 and 1980, the 60-day deadline set for Secretarial review was
not met due to a pre-review, informal consultation stage created by NMFS, acting on
behalf of the Secretary. This consultation stage was designed to allow ultimate approval
of more plans and to allow Councils to modify their FMPs before formal disapproval.
H.R. REt. No. 549, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4320, 4327.
117. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 982, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4320, 4368-4369.
Such criteria were missing from the original Act. As noted by one commentator:
Though each decision maker was assigned a distinct and autonomous role, the
plan implicitly envisioned harmonious interrelationship of the regional councils
and the Secretary. The [M]FCMA did not, however, provide a detailed plan
of how those two authorities would interact but left the resolution of that to the
future.
Rogalski, supra note 77, at 178.
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1854 (a)(1) (1994). Within fifteen days after the plan is received
by the Secretary, she must (1) make any changes to the Council-created regulations
accompanying the plan "as may be necessary for the implementation of the plan," and
(2) publish them in the Federal Register with an explanation of any substantive changes
made. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(1)(D) (1994).
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(1)(A) (1994).
120. The 1983 amendments created a 75-day review period. See 7(a), § 1854(a),
96 Stat. at 2487. This period was reduced in 1986. Sec 106, § 1854(a), 100 Stat. at
3742.
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Guard regarding enforcement within 35 days. If the Secretary notifies
the Council that he does not intend to disapprove the FMP or amendment
within this 35-day period, the Council-created FMP becomes effective at
that time."' If the Secretary disapproves the FMP or amendment, the
Council may submit an amended version.' The Secretary may only
substitute her own management measure for a disapproved one if the
Council fails to act."z However, the Councils face no explicit deadline
for when they must do so.'
In contrast, the Secretary must meet strict deadlines. Upon receipt
of the Council's revision, the Secretary must act within 60 days, or the
revised plan or amendment takes effect and must be implemented.'
Similarly, if the Secretary either fails to notify the relevant Council of his
initial disapproval of the plan upon its receipt or of his disapproval of the
plan during the 35-day period following public comment, the plan "shall
take effect and be implemented" by the Secretary." In effect, an FMP
or amendment to an FMP developed by a Council, instead of being held
to a Secretarial review for consistency with the national standards, may
be presumed consistent in several instances. 7 Congress thus increased
the law-making role of the Councils and diminished Secretarial review
of Council decisions.
While Secretarial review of Council decisions has been diminished,
any regulations promulgated by the Secretary to carry out those decisions
are subject to judicial review to the extent permitted by the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA).1 However, notwithstanding this provision,
"[l]awyers for fisheries groups disappointed by the FMP process will
have a hard time securing relief from the courts because regulations
under the Magnuson Act are essentially impervious to judicial review. "129
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b)(1)(B) (1994).
122. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b)(3)(A) (1994).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1)(B) (1994).
124. Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1)(A) (1994) (if no Council-created FMP for fishery
within reasonable period, Secretary may develop an FMP).
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b)(3)(D) (1994).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b)(1) (1994).
127. Robert J. McManus, America's Saltwater Fisheries: So Few Fish, So Many
Fishermen, 9 A.B.A. Snc. NAT. REsouRCES, ENERGY, AND ENvTL L., Spring 1995, at
13.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b) (1994) (review permitted to extent allowed under 5
U.S.C. § 701-706 (1994)).
129. McManus, supra note 127, at 15.
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This is largely due to the fact that a court may only set aside regulations
which are: 1) arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with law; 2) contrary to constitutional right,
power, privilege, or immunity; 3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority or limitations, or short of statutory right; or 4) without
observance of procedure required by law.13 Unlike those governmental
actions generally subject to the APA, MFCMA regulations may not be
set aside due to the fact that they are: (1) unsupported by substantial
evidence in the administrative record or (2) unwarranted by the facts to
the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by a reviewing
court. 131
As noted by the court in Fishermen's Dock Coop. v. Brown, given
the parameters of review set out in the MFCMA, Secretarial decisions
to promulgate regulations "are entitled to an almost insurmountable
degree of deference." " For example, the court in National Fisheries
Institute, Inc. v. Mosbacher examined "the Secretary's decision to
promulgate [billfish] regulations in light of the administrative record
before him."133 The court presumed the Secretary's actions to be valid
noting that it could not "simply substitute its own judgment for that of
the Secretary."'"' To overcome this presumption, the court would have
had to find "that the administrative record [wa]s so devoid of justification
for the Secretary's decision that the decision [wa]s arbitrary and
capricious. ""' As noted by one commentator: "[s]uch [deference is]
hardly unusual in modern administrative procedure, but, as we have
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b)(1)(B) (1994) (only grounds specified in 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A)-(D) that are sufficient to set aside regulations).
In addition, challengers face standing hurdles and limits on possible relief. See
Hanson v. Klutznik, 506 F. Supp. 582, 586 (D. Alaska 1981) (challenger must have
asserted claim before Council to survive motion to dismiss); Midwater Trawlers Coop.
v. Mosbacher, 727 F. Supp. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 1989) (same); 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b)(1)(A)
(1994) (section 705 of the APA-permitting preliminary injunctive relief found
inapplicable to challenges of regulations promulgated under the MFCMA); see also
McManus, supra note 127, at 15.
131. 5 U.S.C. § 706(E), (F) (1994).
132. Fishermen's Dock Coop. v. Brown, 867 F. Supp. 385, 391 (E.D. Va. 1994);
see also McManus, supra note 127, at 15 ("when challengers get to court, they find that
the joint actions of councils and the Secretary command enormous deference").
133. National Fisheries Inst., Inc. V. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 210, 218 (D.D.C.
1990).
134. Id. at 219.
135. Fishermen's Dock Coop v. Brown, 867 F. Supp. at 391.
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seen, the Magnuson Act is hardly usual because it often requires the
[Secretary] to defer to decisions that are at least suspect on conflict-of-
interest grounds." 6 Illustrating this point is the court's decision in
Alaska Factory Trawlers Ass'n v. Baldridge. 7 At issue in that case was
an amendment to the Gulf of Alaska groundfish FMP. This amendment
was designed to implement the North Pacific Fishery Management
Council's decision to restrict groundfishing by pot fishermen and trawlers
by allocating a large portion of the resource to Alaska longline fishermen
thus limiting out-of-state trawler activity." Challengers attacked the
Secretary's determination that the amendment was consistent with
MFCMA's national standards. National Standard 4, requiring allocations
of fishing privileges to be fair and nondiscriminatory, and National
Standard 5, mandating that conservation and management measures not
have economic allocation as their sole purpose, were said to be violated
by the amendment. The Secretary's decision that they did not was, as the
challengers argued, arbitrary and capricious."' The court, finding that
the record indicated that the amendment was not discriminatory and was
not solely created because of economic objective, did not agree and
upheld the Secretary's decision.'
While amendments creating diminished Secretarial review coupled
with deferential judicial review weakened the main structural safeguards
against self-interested allocation decisions by Council members, other
safeguards were arguably in place due to the interaction of the MFCMA
with existing Federal law. By 1982, agency consensus was that the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) applied to the Councils and
their advisory panels, including their scientific and statistical commit-
tees.'4' FACA was enacted to govern the creation, duration and
procedure of "such committees, boards, commissions, councils,
136. McManus, supra note 127, at 15.
137. 831 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1991).
138. Id. at 1463.
139. Id. at 1464-1465.
140. Id.; see also McManus, supra note 127, at 15-16 (deferential standard required
courts in National Fisheries Institute v. Mosbacher, 732 F.Supp. 210 (D.D.C. 1990) and
C&W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556 (D.D.C. 1991) to allow the Councils and
Secretary to "torque" the FMP process in favor of recreational fishermen).
141. H.R. REP. No. 549, supra note 116, at 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4328. By 1980, the Office of Management and Budget and the General Services
Administration had issued legal opinions that FACA applied to the Regional Councils and
NOAA was generally in accord with this stance. Rogalski, supra note 77, at 196-198.
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conferences, panels, task forces, or other similar groups as the Congress,
the President, or Federal agencies create in the interest of obtaining
advice for the President or for any agency."142
In the opinion of some, the application of FACA to the Councils
"per se" constricted council authority, reducing it "to a mere advisory
function" and undermining the Councils' intended role as "the primary
policy makers under the [M]FCMA." 43 This view stems from FACA's
directive that: "[A]dvisory committees shall be utilized solely for
advisory functions. Determinations of action to be taken and policy to
be expressed with respect to matters upon which an advisory committee
reports or makes recommendations shall be made solely by the President
or an officer of the Federal Government."1 4
However, this directive is not absolute. Advisory committees can
take on non-advisory roles if specifically "provided by statute or
Presidential directive."' 45 Thus, any argument that the application of this
section of FACA itself would have acted as a limit on Council power can
be met with explicit language in the MFCMA and its legislative history
granting the Councils a policy-making role.
More importantly, application of FACA to the Councils subjected
them to FACA's procedural requirements. Any "advisory committee"
governed by FACA must open its meetings to the public, 4 ' generally
publish notice of the meeting in the Federal Register, 47 allow interested
persons to appear before it and submit statements to it,48 and keep
minutes of meetings and make them and certain other documents
available to the public.'49 In addition, an officer or employee of the
Federal Government must chair or attend each meeting of a FACA-
governed advisory committee."5  All meetings and agendas of an
advisory committee must be approved by such an employee.'' By 1982,
the Councils were all "unanimous in their view" that these procedural
142. H.R. REP. No. 1017, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3491.
143. Rogalski, supra note 77, at 194.
144. 5 U.S.C. app. § 9(b) (1994).
145. 5 U.S.C. app. § 9(b) (1994).
146. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(1) (1994).
147. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(2) (1994).
148. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(3) (1994).
149. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(b) (1994).
150. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(e) (1994).
151. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(f) (1994).
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requirements should not apply to their advisory panels.' In addition,
while not generally objecting to the application of these requirements to
regular Council meetings, the Councils were concerned that the specific
procedures laid out in FACA effectively precluded emergency meetings
or agenda changesY'
The 1983 amendments to the MFCMA, discussed above, which
increased the operative,' law-making role of the Councils also
addressed these concerns regarding FACA. In the House Report of the
legislation eventually enacted, the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries disagreed with the agency consensus that FACA applied to the
Regional Councils.'5 According to the Committee, it was Congress'
intent "that the public be made fully aware of the meetings and proposed
agenda of the Councils and their subsidiary organs ... [but that] [i]t was
not intended for FACA['s procedural requirements] to be rigidly
applied." 6 In addition, the Committee, faced with required federal
presence at advisory panel meetings under FACA, found that it was
likely to be the case that advisory panels would meet in the absence of
a federal employee and that the possible invalidation of decisions reached
at such meetings was not intended by Congress.' It was also felt that
this requirement should not be applied because "the level of direct
Federal control and oversight contemplated by this provision of FACA"
was inappropriate in the context of the Regional Councils.' Prerequisite
federal approval of meetings and agendas under FACA was similarly
thought to be inappropriate.' 9
152. It was felt that deadlines under FACA, deadlines under the MFCMA and
publication deadlines for the Federal Register all conflicted in such a way as to preclude
Councils from getting the advice of their advisory panels in certain circumstances. H.R.
REP. No. 549, supra note 116, at 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4329.
153. Id.
154. This action alone could be interpreted as taking the Councils out of the
purview of FACA's definition of "advisory committee." See H.R. REP. No. 1017, supra
note 142, at 4, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3494.
155. H.R. REP. No. 549, supra note 116, at 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4329 (language in Conference Report on MFCMA which indicated that FACA is to
apply has been misinterpreted).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 16-17, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4329-4330; see also,
Rogalski, supra note 77, at 195-196.
159. H.R. REP. No. 549, supra note 116, at 17, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4330.
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Thus, the 1983 Amendments to MFCMA expressly made FACA
inapplicable to the Councils or to the scientific and statistical committees
or advisory panels of the Councils."W However, "[t]o carry out the
original intent of the Congress," the amendments established "simplified
public notification procedures in [FACA's] place."161 These procedures
are substantially the same as the FACA requirements." Any checks on
the Councils which would have resulted from public scrutiny and input
under FACA are still intact. The major change caused by the exemption
was the removal of the direct federal oversight which would have
resulted from FACA-required federal approval of and attendance at all
meetings.
Agency consensus in 1982 was also that Council members and their
staffs were subject to federal criminal statutes"s covering bribery and
conflict of interest. " The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
noted "justifiable anxiety on the part of Council members and their
administrative staffs about the legal responsibilities they have
assumed. "5 However, nothing was done regarding the status of Council
members under the criminal statutes at that time. In 1986, the
Committee again noted "a considerable amount of confusion over the
status of the Councils with respect to conflict of interest statutes. "16
160. Pub. L. No. 97-453, sec. 5(5), § 1852, 96 Stat. 2481, 2485 (1982).
161. H.R. REP. No. 549, supra note 116, at 17, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4330; see Pub. L. No. 97-453, sec 5(5), § 1852, 96 Stat. 2481, 2485 (1982) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 18520) (1994)).
162. Most council and committee meetings must be open to the public; timely
public notice of the meetings must generally be given in local newspapers of the major
relevant fishing ports and in the Federal Register; interested persons must generally be
permitted to present statements regarding subjects on the agenda; minutes of most
meetings must be kept; and the administrative record of the meetings must generally be
available to the public. 16 U.S.C. § 1852G)(2) (1994). In addition, in 1990, Congress
required the Councils to allow interested members of the public to respond to new data
submitted by a State or Federal agency or from a Council advisory body at any time a
Council decides to consider such new information. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(j)(6) (1994).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1994).
164. H.R. REP. No. 549, supra note 116, at 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4328. In 1978, "the NOAA Office of General Counsel determined that Council staff
members were covered by the Federal conflict of interest laws. The Department of
Justice and the Office of Government Ethics of the Office of Personnel Management
concurred in that opinion." 54 Fed. Reg. 1701-1702 (1989).
165. H.R. REP. No. 549, supra note 116, at 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4328.
166. H.R. REP. No. 165, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986
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This time, because "Congress intended that citizens, such as fishermen
who obviously have a direct financial interest in fisheries, play a role in
the operation of the Councils-either as Council members, or as
members of advisory panels,"" 6 Council members were exempted from
the federal statute governing conflict with regard to financial interest"s
on the condition that they fully disclose their financial connections.169
The exemption of Council members from this federal criminal statute
greatly eroded the safeguard against financial conflicts in its provisions.
If governed by the federal statute, a Council member would generally be
criminally liable for participating in any decision in which he has a
financial interest. 10 Disclosure of a financial interest by a Council
member would allow that member to continue to participate with
impunity only if (1) the Government official responsible for the
member's appointment determined that the interest "is not so substantial
as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity" of her service;' 7' (2) the
financial interest has been exempted from the statute's requirements by
regulation because it is too remote to affect the integrity of the member's
service; 71 or (3) if the interest results solely from birth rights in certain
Indian tribes, allotments or claims.' 73  Under the MFCMA as now
written, a Council member may participate in decisions upon mere
disclosure, with no requirement that any determination be made
regarding the threat of the member's interest to the integrity of the
Council decision-making process.
In sum, various amendments to the MFCMA have removed pro-
tections originally in place to protect the integrity of the Council
decision-making process. While Council members are bound to follow
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6249, 6254.
167. Id.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1994).
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(k) (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 601.37 (1995); see also H.R. REP.
No. 165, supra note 166, at 14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6249, 6254-6255.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1994).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1) (1994).
172. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2) (1994).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 208 b)(4) (1994).
Individuals serving on advisory committees governed by FACA may be exempted
from the section's provisions if the relevant government official determines that the need
for the individual's services outweighs the potential for a conflict of interest created by
the financial interest involved. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(3) (1994). As discussed above,
FACA does not apply to the Regional Fishery Management Councils.
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the National Standards in developing and amending their FMPs, 74
Secretarial review of the consistency of Council decisions with those
National Standards has been diminished. Council activity has been
removed from the direct federal scrutiny required of advisory councils
governed by FACA."7 s Council members are now allowed to participate
in decisions in which they have financial interests upon mere disclosure
of that interest. Finally, judicial review of Council and Secretarial
decisions has been extremely deferential.
There still exist some checks on Council members which serve to
protect the FMP process. Although, in some cases, Council-made FMPs
or amendments are presumed consistent with national standards, and
although Councils play a large part in drafting proposed regulations to
accompany those FMPs or amendments, the Secretary still has a final
federal say. 76 Also, the substance of FACA's public notice require-
ments are still applicable to the Councils by the very terms of the
MFCMA. Public scrutiny, thus, still serves as a check on Council
activities. Third, while the conflict of interest statute governing financial
interests has been made inapplicable to Council members making full
disclosure, the rest of the battery of federal criminal conflict and bribery
174. The fact that the Councils are required to follow the National Standards has
been said to be an ineffectual check on the Councils in and of itself given the fact that
the standards are "vague and bromidic," their "meaning ... usually hard to pin down."
McManus, supra note 127, at 14.
175. Arguably, such oversight was never intended to apply to the Councils in any
event. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text; see also Applicability of
Executive Order No. 12674 to Personnel of Regional Fishery Management Councils, Off.
Legal Counsel, available in LEXIS, 1993 OLC LEXIS 14 at 11-12 [hereinafter Office
of Legal Counsel Opinion] (detailing two features of the Magnuson Act which
demonstrate that Congress did not intend appointed Council members to be subject to the
supervision of the Secretary).
176. As noted by the Office of Legal Counsel:
However independent the Councils may be in their day-to-day operations,
ultimate authority over a majority of their membership, budgets, and their
major area of concern - the fishery management plans - remains with the
Secretary or other federal agencies. The Councils perform the basic research,
hold hearings, draft the plan for their area, and propose regulations. It is the
Secretary, however, to whom drafts and proposals are submitted and it is the
Secretary who either approves the management plan or amends it to his
satisfaction. It is also the Secretary who reviews the regulations to insure their
legality and who implements them.
Office of Legal Counsel Opinion, supra note 175, at 17.
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statutes do apply to the councils.1' The Secretary has also promulgated
regulations defining certain standards of conduct expected of Council
members and employees. 7 "
In addition, in response to complaints that imbalances in Council
membership have "skewed decisions made by the Councils on regulatory
and allocation matters," 79 Congress took steps to ensure that Council
membership is fairly apportioned. While the power of the Secretary to
remove Council members is quite limited,18 the 1986 amendments
increased his authority with regard to appointments. Now, the Secretary
must "in making appointments . . . to the extent practicable, ensure a
fair and balanced apportionment... of the active participants ... in the
commercial and recreational fisheries under the jurisdiction of the
Council."' Since 1990, the Secretary has also been required to
annually report actions taken to ensure fair apportionment to Congress."
Steps have also been taken to ensure that only those qualified for
177. 50 C.F.R. § 601.35(a) (1995).
178. 50 C.F.R. § 601.35(b) (1995).
179. S. REP. No 414, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6276, 6283.
180. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(5) (1994). The Secretary may only remove a member
for cause upon the recommendation of two-thirds of the voting members of the relevant
Council. This provision was designed to "constrain narrowly the Secretary's ability to
supervise and control the Council members he appoints." Office of Legal Counsel
Opinion, supra note 175, at 3. While "the case law clearly supports the view that 'for
cause' limitations on removal power can be compatible with the continuing power and
duty to supervise," the statutory scheme of the MPCMA not only limits the removal
power but it "vests that power jointly in the Secretary and the Councils themselves...
. As a result, the Councils possess greater autonomy than that enjoyed, for example, by
typical 'independent' agencies." Id. at 16.
181. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(B) (1994); see also 50 C.F.R. § 601.33(h) (1995).
Council members are appointed for a term of three years and may be reappointed
to serve no more three consecutive terms. However, the Secretary may "designate a
term of appointment shorter than the normal three years if necessary to provide for
balanced expiration of terms of office." 50 C.F.R. § 601.32 (1995).
Creating another possible solution to the problem of fair representation among user
groups, the 1990 amendments to the MFCMA require each Council to create a fishing
advisory committee with membership fairly apportioned among commercial fishing
interests in the relevant region. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(3) (1994). As noted in an NMFS
response to a public comment: "Considering the limited number of appointments to any
one Council, representation could not be provided for all major fishing gear types. The
FIAC is one appropriate mechanism to allow Councils to provide representation for all
gear types in the Council process." 57 Fed. Reg. 375, 376 (1994).
182. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)0B) (1994).
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Council membership be appointed."l  However, in the face of the
increasing need to allocate fishery privileges among user groups, all of
the above described checks on the Council system, even coupled with
measures designed to create fair apportionment, are not enough to ward
off the perception of conflict on the Councils and to ensure fair decisions
which properly balance short-term need against the long-term health of
the nation's fisheries.
C. Case Study: The North Pacific Council
An examination of the controversy surrounding a recent allocation
decision of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC)
will illustrate the current criticisms of the existing checks on the
Councils. In 1991, following precedent set by the Pacific Fishery
Management Council,"8 the NPFMC decided, by a 9-2 vote, to divide
pollock and cod allocations between the shore-based processors and
183. The 1990 amendments to the MFCMA clarify the knowledge and experience
requirements of 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(A) (1994). They also require the Secretary to
develop regulations establishing criteria for assessing whether an individual satisfies these
requirements. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(A) (1994); see 50 C.F.R. § 601.33(b) (1994).
These criteria are to be used by Governors in nominating Council members. S. REP.
No. 414, supra note 179, at 12, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6287. In addition,
Governors must now accompany their nominations with statements explaining how each
individual meets the requirements set out in the MFCMA. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(C)
(1994).
184. In March 1991, the Pacific Fishery Management Council decided to divide the
West Coast whiting catch between coastal processors and factory trawlers. Trawler Fleet
Makes Waves Down Coast, ANCHORAGE DAmLY NEws, Mar. 16, 1991, at Gi. This
decision was attacked on the grounds that "[ait-sea processing interests were not
adequately represented on the [PFMC] or its subcommittees," and that "[tihe Council
members who supported th[e] rule ha[d] a conflict of interest." Pacific Coast Groundfish
Fishery, 56 Fed. Reg. 43,718, 43723 (1991). NMFS responded by saying that:
Representatives [of at-sea processors] have been welcome at, and participated,
in Council and subcommittee meetings at which this allocation was derived..
. . Due to the number and diversity of issues facing the Council, not all
interest groups can be represented on the Council at one time.
. . . [Tihe Council is made up at least partly of representatives of various
fisheries. Their participation in . . . management actions, after proper
disclosure, is anticipated.., and does not constitute a conflict of interest. ...
NMFS is aware of the composition of the Council and performs its own review
of the record for fishery regulations.
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factory trawlers operating in the areas.'1 The shore-based processors
were allocated thirty-five percent of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Island
pollock quotas in 1992 and forty percent in 1993. The Gulf pollock was
entirely allocated to the onshore processors as well as ninety percent of
the Gulf cod take.
Dubbed the "Shoreside Preference Amendment" by one commenta-
tor, this allocation was widely criticized by the Seattle-based trawlers and
their supporters.186 There were allegations that the Council decision
mainly benefitted Alaska shoreside processing plants owned by the
Japanese companies responsible for overfishing in the international
waters of the Central Bering Sea and penalized the "U.S. factory trawler
fleet that Americanized the domestic pollock fishery."'" Critics of the
decision also pointed to the fact that Washington stood to lose over 1,000
jobs as a result of the allocationr and that the decision could mean
higher prices for fish by curbing the free market. 89
185. T.A. Badger, Council's Cod, Pollock Allocations Irk Some Processors,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWs, June 29, 1991, at Bi; John Iani, Facts Omitted, Motives
Unquestioned in Fishery Articles, SEATTLE TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1991, at A7. Despite
written opinions by the Commerce Department's Inspector General and the antitrust
section of the Justice Department that the allocation program was unjustified, it was
eventually approved in part by NMFS. NMFS rejected the post-1992 increases of the
inshore allocation. Groundfish of the Gulf of Alaska; Groundfish Fishery of the Bering
Sea and Aleutian Islands, 57 Fed. Reg. 23321 (1992). See David Whitney, Justice
Department Puts Another Nail Into Pollock Plans, ANCHORAGE DAiLY NEws, Feb. 7,
1992, at C2; David Schaefer, U.S. Urged to Reject Proposal to Split Alaska Pollock
Catch, SEATT E TIMs, Feb. 22, 1992. On June 14, 1995, the NPFMC voted to extend
the allocation plan for three years. The AFTA said that it would support the extension.
Fish Council OKs Quota Extension, ANCHORAGE DAiLY NEws, June 15, 1995, at Fl.
186. Robert F. Morgan, Compass Decision Favors Foreign Trawlers, Snubs U.S.
Fleet, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEws, Oct. 29, 1991, at B5 (author is president of American
Factory Trawler Association).
187. Id.; see also Duff Wilson, A Fishy Situation, SATTLETIMES, Nov. 10, 1991,
at Al, A18 reprinted in Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 35. ($250 million of annual
fish product shifted from Seattle-based floating factory fleet to a largely Japanese-owned
processing industry on the Alaska shore).
188. Wilson, supra note 187, at A18.
189. Id.
When the allocation decision was made, Joseph Blum, then Director of
Washington's Department of Fisheries, noted that: "[the numbers adopted... will
basically make a major economic allocation to one segment of the industry... that isn't
the free market system." Badger, supra note 185, at Bi. Blum later became the
executive director of AFTA. See Tom Brown, Pollock Allocation Plan Extended,
SEATiLE TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1992, at Dl.
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Supporters of the Council's decision countered the trawlers' attack.
In one editorial, John Iani, president of the Pacific Seafood Processors
Association, questioned the motives of the trawlers."9 He accused them
of "Japan-bashing" and pointed out that the allocation made was between
the offshore trawlers and, not the inshore processors, but the vessels
servicing them, mostly American-owned vessels based in Washington. 1'
He argued that jobs lost by the allocation measure would be offset by
jobs created in the inshore-sector,1" and that the allocation need not
result in higher fish prices."9 Iani pointed out the conservation-minded
motives behind the allocation," for example, the fact that trawler-
processing tends to produce more waste than onshore processing. He
argued that the Council spent two and one-half years studying the
resource and came to the conclusion that, in the absence of some sort of
allocation, factory trawlers "would take all the available fish . . . and
move on, resulting in the collapse of entire fishing ports."' 95  He
A free market system would benefit the factory trawlers: "The factory trawlers,
which are able to catch and process the fish on the fishing grounds while the catch is
freshest, were likely to win a competitive battle with onshore plants that must rely on
catch brought to them over often considerable distances by catcher boats." Tom Brown,
Fishing for Answers: Pollock Season at Hand, but Factory-Trawler Fleet is Facing
Stormy Seas, SEATrLE TIMES, May 31, 1992, at C1.
190. Iani, supra note 185, at A7.
191. Id.; see also Christopher Connell, Bush Campaign Aide Wades Into Lobbying
Battle Over Fish Processing, Associated Press, Jan. 9, 1992, reprinted in Conflict
Hearing, supra note 1, at 63 (inshore processors' representative argues that there is
foreign investment in both the onshore and factory trawler industry); Tom Kenworthy,
Bush Campaign Aide Seeks Break for Japanese, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1992, at A12
reprinted in Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 56 (in opinion of Washington state
official, it was "phony argument" to characterize the dispute as one between U.S. and
foreign interests. "It's a tossup .... There's foreign investment in both places.")
192. But see Connell, supra note 191, at 63 (trawler representative argues that the
jobs in the onshore sector wold be lower-paying jobs).
193. Id. (Trawler representative argues that the proposed allocations would cut
revenues by 30 percent).
194. In fact, as reported during the controversy: "The Council does get high marks
for conservation. The panel routinely votes for a lower cap on fishing than scientists say
they need to preserve the stock in the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea. Other Councils,
notably in New England, have allowed overfishing to the point of depletion." Wilson,
supra note 187, at A19.
195. lani, supra note 185, at A7. The effectiveness of the allocation measure from
the standpoint of conservation has been questioned. For example, the Justice
Department, in written comments to the Commerce Department, agreed that "there are
problems with the present 'Olympic system' under which the council sets a total harvest
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accused the factory trawlers, "[w]ith a fleet large enough to harvest more
than three times the existing pollock quota," of wanting "all the fish."" 9
Such claims by the measure's supporters that it was soundly
grounded did not prevent allegations of conflict of interest on the Council
from being central to the debate. By and large, the factory trawlers
charged that the MFCMA had inadequately insulated the allocation
decision from the financial conflicts of its members. First, the
provisions of the MFCMA providing for fair apportionment were seen
as having failed. The NPFMC was charged with being "dominated by
Alaskans and by members who work for fish-processing companies."'"
The general view of the factory trawlers was summarized thus:
"[p]eople talk about the fox guarding the hen house... what we've got
here is a few roosters divvying up the hens.""' Second, they felt that
Secretarial review would not be effective, noting that, although the
Secretary nominally makes the final decision, "the [S]ecretary .. .
almost never overrules a Council decision and is not expected to do so
in this case. ""' Finally, they were not confident that the safeguards
against Council members acting to benefit their own financial self-interest
were adequate to make the decision-making process fair. As one
commentator pointed out:
Four of the 1 1 Council members own fishing businesses. Two
are industry group employees. One is a consultant who makes
volume benefiting those who can catch the most fish the fastest. . . . [Clompanies
competing in that system, whether they operate factory ships or shore-based plant, are
encouraged to spend more . . . so that they can take a greater share of the quota."
David Whitney, Justice Department Puts Another Nail Into Pollock Plans, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEws, Feb. 7, 1992, at C2. However, the comments went on to say that "[a]ll
the Council's allocation plan would do ... is create a two-class Olympic system where
the same inefficiencies persist" and to recommend Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs)
as the solution. Id.
196. Iani, supra note 185, at A7.
197. Ross Anderson, Fishy Business: Seattle Fishermen Urge Using Market to
Allocate Resource, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at El.
As noted later, the issue of council reform in the North Pacific became somewhat
of a geographic war between Alaska and Washington. North Pacific Fishery Council
Conflicts of Interest Should be Eliminated, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at A6; see
also Fishery Panel Overhaul Sought, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 4, 1993, at Dl.
198. Anderson, supra note 197, at El.
199. Wilson, supra note 187, at A18; see also Kenworthy, supra, note 191 at A12
(Secretary rarely rejects the decisions of the eight regional councils).
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no secret of the fact he hopes to make money off his inside
expertise.... [Although Council members] are required to file
financial disclosure statements and take an oath to vote in the
national interest ... some ... say the national interest is often
equivalent to their own business interest.'
In November 1991, the American Factory Trawlers Association
(AFTA) approached the Department of Justice and the Department of
Commerce Inspector General "to try to have conflict-of-interest charges
investigated.""' These charges focused mainly on three individuals.
One Council member was charged with changing his vote on a measure
opposed by crab operators shortly after taking a consulting job from that
group.' One was charged with voting "to allow Japanese fishing
companies to take 10 million pounds of cod from the U.S. fishing zone
after he struck a private deal for his company to sell them a million
pounds of cod fillets."' The latter was said to have benefitted from the
Council's definition of "inshore" facility. Allegedly, another member
voted in favor of defining such facilities in a manner tailor-made to
permit his three boats to fish the resources allocated to the inshore
industry.' In addition, several former Council staff members were
accused of conflicts.' ° An investigation was conducted.'
The legal interpretation of the case by the Inspector General's
General Counsel centered on the federal regulations exempting Council
members from the federal conflict of interest statutes if they disclose that
the financial interests they hold may come within the jurisdiction of the
Council.?' Council employees are generally prohibited by those
regulations from maintaining financial interests that conflict with the fair
200. Wilson, supra note 187, at Al, A18.
201. Id. at A18.
202. Id.
203. Id. This member, Oscar Dyson, was also accused of supporting onshore
allocation due to his status as a shareholder in a Kodiak onshore plant. Id. at A19.
204. Id. at A18, A19 (Council member Ron Hogge approved a plan that included
trawlers less than 125 feet as part of the in-shore fleet while excluding larger competing
trawlers. Hegge's trawlers are under 80 feet in length).
205. Wilson, supra note 187, at A19; Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 78.
206. See Memorandum dated June 30, 1992 from Inspector General Frank
DeGeorge to General Counsel, reprinted in Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 77.
Government to Investigate North Pacific Fish Council, SEATTLE TimEs, Nov. 17, 1991,
at A13.
207. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 79.
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and impartial conduct of their duties.' Also, Council members are
prohibited from participating in:
1) particular matters primarily of individual concern in which
they have a financial interest, and
2) matters of general public concern that are likely to have a
direct and predictable effect on their financial interests,
unless that interest is in harvesting, processing, or marketing
activities and has been disclosed....
The Inspector General found no violation of law in the North Pacific
because the members in question disclosed their interests.210 In addition,
although each member had benefitted from the allocation, since the vote
affected a large class of boat owners,21' the matter was not a "particular
matter of individual concern." 21 Nor was the matter involved found to
be a matter that had a "direct and predictable effect" on the members'
financial interests. 213
The General Counsel noted that "[a]lthough we uncovered abuses,
our investigation did not substantiate any violations of criminal laws. "214
That was because "conduct that is forbidden under criminal conflict of
interest laws in other contexts is permitted under the laws establishing the
NPFMC and the other Regional Councils. The legal framework
governing NPFMC operations makes this possible: it anticipates
conflicts of interest but establishes an exempting mechanism for the
Council's voting members and Executive Director. "215
The Inspector General's conclusion that nothing sanctionable had
occurred was seen by the trawlers as masking the underlying inequity in
the MFCMA's provisions. As noted by the AFTA, "[the investigation]
confirms what we were saying .. . except for the cover the Magnuson
208. 50 C.F.R. § 601.35(b)(4) (1995).
209. 50 C.F.R. § 601.35(b)(8) (1995).
210. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 67.
211. NMFS records indicated that there were 95 boats of 125 feet or less engaged
in the groundfish business. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 81. Two of the members
investigated owned such boats, defined as "inshore vessels" by the vote in question. Id.
at 81, 83.
212. Id. at 67, 78-89.
213. Id. at 67.
214. Id. at 79.
215. Id.
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Act gives these people, [their behavior] would be a serious violation."216
The General Counsel for the Department of Commerce noted that its
report "exposes some fundamental problems with the operations of the
Fishery Management Councils."217
IV. RETHINKING THE REGIONAL COUNCIL SYSTEM
A. The Need for Change
As revealed by the North Pacific controversy, under the current legal
structure, it is almost impossible for a Council member to have a
sanctionable conflict of interest unless the individual in question
personally benefits financially as a direct result of any one vote. Even
in such a case, if the vote pertains to the member's interest in harvesting,
processing or marketing activities and it has been disclosed, the member
will still be immune from penalties for participating in the vote."'
Also revealed by the North Pacific experience is the fact that the
absence of a legal violation does not equal the absence of a perceived
conflict of interest. As pointed out by the Inspector General before the
House Subcommittee on Fisheries Management, in spite of his finding
that no legal violation had occurred, "clearly there was a perception that
certain members were controlling Council actions to maximize their
personal financial interests."219 Thus, the problem revealed centers
around the discrepancy between the public perception of the Regional
Councils and the legal framework within which they work. The public
defines an impermissible conflict more broadly than does the legal
regime.' Thus, the integrity of that regime is called into question when
216. Duff Wilson, Federal Conflict-of-Interest Probe Clears Fishery Council
Members: Report Cites Abuses, But Not Illegal Acts, SEATTLE TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1993, at
A8.
217. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 77.
218. Id. at 19.
219. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 7.
220. For example, when studying the alleged conflicts on the Councils, the World
Wildlife Fund defined an impermissible conflict as "any outside interest that impedes a
council member's ability to act as a responsible steward of fishery resources and make
management decisions that will result in the greatest overall benefit to the nation."
MANAGING U.S. MARINE FISHERIES: PUBLIC INTEREST OR CONFLICT OF INTEREST 4
(World Wildlife Fund, 1995).
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a member acts in a manner which falls into the gap between the two
definitions.
In addition, there is evidence that this public skepticism regarding
Council-member behavior is not unfounded. It may be based on a valid
concern that the make-up of the Councils is threatening the long-term
health of the nation's fisheries. A 1995 report by the World Wildlife
Fund documents several instances where Council members with direct,
financial interests in certain fisheries have voted in such a way as to
directly undermine the long-term conservation of the resource.' Such
behavior by Council members reflects an improper public/private power
balance on the Councils, as free-riding by the users charged with
managing the resource goes unchecked by any external force.'
Even in the face of these problems, few have suggested dismantling
the Council system in favor of pure privatization or purely centralized
management by the federal government. The suggestions offered to
Congress as it has contemplated the reauthorization of the MFCMA
consist of "a broad range of options ... ranging from greater financial
disclosure to stricter rules dictating when a member must abstain from
Council activities due to his or her financial interests."' However, few
have suggested that the Regional Council system itself must be abolished
or even fundamentally changed.' The justification given for retaining
the current system is commonly based on the supposed merits of
allowing experienced and knowledgeable users a role in management.'
Allowing interested and, incidentally, knowledgeable and experi-
enced people to make management decisions is valuable in that such a
cooperative strategy may yield the economies associated with cooperative
management. These include a reduction in the transactions costs
associated with enforcement and enhanced data gathering."6 However,
when there is a widespread perception that unfair or self-serving behavior
is occurring, those economies diminish.
For example, enforcement of fisheries regulations in the absence of
cooperative management can be costly. "The inherent vulnerability of
stocks, especially the mobile ones, to overexploitation, and the impossi-
221. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 220, at 25.
222. See supra note 13.
223. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 67.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
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bility of policing large areas adequately means that government cannot
manage alone even at the best of times."227 Yet, the economies in
enforcement gained from cooperative management' will only occur as
long as the management system including users is perceived to be just.
In order to gain the cooperation of fishermen, managers must maintain
credibility. When that credibility is in question, the whole management
system is placed in jeopardy. 9
The need for such credibility has been recognized in the discussion
surrounding the Regional Councils: "[I]n order to have faith in the
decisions being made, the public must perceive that those in charge of
approving and implementing [an FMP] are free of direct financial
benefits that would influence them to favor individual benefit over the
general good."' For the Council system to yield the efficiencies
associated with cooperative management, public faith in the councils,
especially the faith of the users of the resource,21 must be restored and
free-riding must be prevented. These objectives can only be accom-
plished by a congressional redelegation of fishery management authority.
A new balance of power between the Councils and the coercive actors
designed to check their authority must be created to ensure the integrity
of the system.
B. Current Legislation
There are currently two bills before Congress which attempt to deal
with the fact that, despite the existence of federal management plans for
most important U.S. fisheries, most of them have still become over-
fished.r The two bills, H.R. 39'33 and S. 39,1 deal with many of the
227. Pinkerton, supra note 14, at 23.
228. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
229. Pinkerton, supra note 14, at 23-24.
230. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of Frank DeGeorge, Inspector
General, U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
231. "If the Council process is to be effective, public confidence in that process
must be restored." Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Maria Cantwell, Wash.).
232. Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fishery, Conservation, andManagementAct:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1993) (statement of Douglas K. Hall, Asst. Secretary of Commerce
for Oceans and Atmosphere, NOAA).
233. H.R. 39, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed in House on October 18,
1995, referred to the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee on
October 19, 1995).
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problems, apart from the make-up of the Councils, thought to plague
management under the MFCMA. 5  They both attempt to address the
problems of byeatch," 6 overflishing,' and fishery habitat destruction. 8
Both bills seek to address the problems facing fishing communities and
their local fleets. 9 They both address Individual Transferable Quota
234. S. 39, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (reported out of committee on March 28,
1996).
235. See generally 141 CONG. REc. H9116-9118 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1995)
(statement of H.R. 39 sponsor Rep. Don Young, Alaska); 141 CONG. REc. S233-235
(daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Sen. Ted Stevens, Alaska, regarding S. 39).
236. See H.R. 39, supra note 233, § 3(c) (makes it the policy of MFCMA to
encourage development of measures which minimize bycatch), § 7 (amends national
standards to include minimization of bycatch), § 9 (measures to reduce bycatch must be
included inFMPs to maximum extentpracticable); S. 39, supra note 234, § 102 (purpose
of management system is to encourage development in a non-wasteful manner), § 111
(FMP must assess the level of byeatch in the fishery).
237. See e.g. H.R. 39, supra note 233, § 4(b) (optimum yield redefined as number
of fish necessary, in case of an overfished fishery, to rebuild the resource), § 9(a) (FMPs
must include objective determinations of what constitutes overfishing in the fishery and
a rebuilding program if that point is reached), § 10(e) (Secretary shall notify relevant
Council of overfishing and if Council fails to develop rebuilding plan within one year,
the Secretary shall take necessary action); S. 39, supra note 234, § 103 (redefines
optimum yield inmanner similar to H.R. 39), § 109 (conservationmeasures shallprevent
overfishing and rebuild overfished resources), § 111 (FMPs must specify criteria for
determining whether a fishery is overfished).
238. See e.g. H.R. 39, supra note 233, § 3(a) (amends findings of Congress to
acknowledge importance of habitat loss), § 3(b) (amends purposes of the act to include
the promotion of fishery habitat conservation), § 8(e) (requires increased communication
with federal agencies regarding essential and other fishery habitat), § 9(a) (FMPs must
include description of the essential fishery habitat for the fishery and measures to
minimize adverse impacts on it), § 10 (Secretary must establish guidelines to aid
Councils in describing and identifying essential fishery habitat); S. 39, supra note 234,
§ 102 (amends findings to acknowledge the damage to fish populations due to habitat
loss, to recognize that national management should facilitate the protection of essential
fish habitat and to recognize that one of the greatest long-term threats to fisheries is
habitat loss), § 102 (amends purposes to include the protection of essential fish habitat
in reviewing federal projects), § 111 (FMPs must facilitate the protection of essential fish
habitat).
239. See, e.g., H.R. 39, supra note 233, § 4(b) (redefines optimum yield to include
the level of fishing that provides employment through participation of local fleets and
coastal communities), § 4(b) (redefines "efficiency" to mean a level of fishing which will
maximize local participation), § 9 (FMPs shall take into account the welfare of local
communities), § 10 (Secretary, inperforming economic analysis of plans, must consider
the costs/benefits to local fleets and communities); S. 39, supra note 233, § 109 (amends
national standards to require measures to take into account the importance of the harvest
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programs,' and contain vessel buy-out programs to deal with over-
capitalization." 1
In addition, the bills deal with Council power and procedure. The
wisdom of these proposed changes to the Council system may be the key
to the success of other new measures. This is so because any new
provision designed to improve fishery conservation depends for its
efficacy on proper implementation by the Council system. Whether the
amendments to the MFCMA will be effective, then, is arguably
contingent on whether the proposed changes to the Councils, found in the
bills, can bring the Council system closer to a true cooperative
management system with incentives balanced so as to prevent free-riding
behavior.
1. Nonuser Members
The House bill attempts to alter the character of the Councils so that
all of the voting members do not have direct financial interests in the
relevant fisheries. 2 It strengthens the language of the Act, making it a
purpose of the MFCMA to "ensure that conservation and management
decisions with respect to the nation's fishery resources are made in a fair
and equitable manner.""3 It then revises the definition of a "fair and
balanced apportionment" of voting seats on the Councils by directing the
Secretary, to the extent practicable, to include "individuals selected for
their fisheries expertise as demonstrated by their academic training,
to fishery dependent communities).
240. H.R. 39, supra note 233, § 16; S. 39, supra note 234, § 111.
241. H.R. 39, supra note 233, § 17; S. 39, supra note 234, §§ 119, 301-305.
242. Some congressional witnesses advocated barring all members with direct
financial interests from participating on the Councils. August 1993 Hearing, supra note
3, at 171, 178-179 (statements of Peter Foley, representing the American Fishing Tackle
Manufacturers Association and the Sport Fishing Institute and Carl Safina, representing
the Marine Fish Conservation Network). It was felt that participation should be left to
biologists knowledgeable about the stewardship of marine resources, with very heavy
advisory input from the industry. Id. at 179. The House provision seems to adopt the
position of others who, although not willing to sever the industry from the Councils,
argued that Council membership at least be explicitly balanced by the MFCMA so that
the "lion's share" of people on the Council do not have a direct financial interest in
Council decisions. Conflict Hearing, supra note 1, at 13 (statement of Frank DeGeorge,
Inspector General, U.S. Dept. Of Commerce).
243. H.R. 39, supra note 233, at § 3(b).
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marine conservation advocacy, consumer advocacy, or other affiliation
with nonuser groups," when choosing the voting members.'
Currently, the FMP process provides a mechanism for the user
groups represented on the Councils to develop management measures
governing their own behavior and that of other users of the resource.
The addition of nonusers to the Councils may serve to dispel some fears
that the users on the Council are engaging in self-serving behavior to the
detriment of the resource. However, the fewer users involved in creating
management measures which are to be imposed on the use of a common
resource, the further the management system is from an ideal cooperative
management system. 5 Users may not see nonusers as worthy to impose
restrictions on them." For example, when the required inclusion of
academics and environmentalists on the Councils was proposed by
various groups during the debate over reauthorization, commercial
industry representatives charged that non-industry participants would not
necessarily be disinterested decision-makers, neutrally monitoring the
behavior of the user members, and consistently making wise management
decisions.' However, such a reaction among the users could be
theoretically counterbalanced. To accomplish this, the placement of
244. H.R. 39, supra note 233, at § 8(b).
245. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. In fact, it has been suggested
that any change in Council membership should involve the inclusion of more active,
working fishermen. August 1993 Hearing, supra note 3, at 229 (prepared statement of
the Seafarers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO).
246. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
247. For example, one group argued:
[I]n addition to the commercial industry, there is a large industry that supports
the sports fishermen, and there is also an environmental industry in this
country, which is gaining from these issues .... [When you talk about
conflict of interest, let us make sure we talk about all of the conflicts of interest
that exist, not just those for commercial fishermen.
August 1993 Hearing, supra note 3, at 163 (statement of Lee Weddig, representative of
the National Fisheries Institute); see also id. at 199 (prepared statement of the Oregon
Trawl Commission); Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act-Part 1I:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries Management of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (September 29, 1993)
[hereinafter September 1993 Hearing] (prepared statement of Pacific Coast Federation
of Fishermen's Association); id. at 109 (Seafood Consumers and Producers Association);
Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fishery, Conservation and ManagementAct: Hearings
Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong., lst Sess.
121 (August 19, 20, 21) [hereinafter Alaska Hearing] (statement of Chris Blackburn,
director of Alaska Groundfish Data Bank).
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nonusers on the Councils to "check" the exercise of power by the users
would need to be coupled with a mechanism for user input.
One way user input could still reach the newly-composed Councils
would be through an advisory panel. Each Council is currently required
to maintain a fishing industry advisory committee.u These committees
are to make recommendations regarding FMPs and amendments to
them."9 However, all of these recommendations are only to be
considered advisory in nature.' Thus, while the advisory panels give
the fishers input, they do not give them, under the statute, any power.
S. 39 contains a provision which would slightly alter this situation.
The Senate bill would amend the MFCMA to provide for the creation of
"negotiated conservation and management measures."" Whenever (1)
a finite number of identifiable interests will be significantly affected by
a management measure; (2) there is a reasonable likelihood that a
negotiation panel can be convened with a balanced representation of
persons willing to represent those interests and act in good faith to reach
consensus regarding the management measure; (3) there is a reasonable
likelihood that a negotiation panel will contribute to the development of
the measure within a fixed period of time; and 4) the negotiation process
will not unreasonably delay the development of the measure, the relevant
Council may establish such a negotiation panel.2 If this is done, the
Council must "to the maximum extent possible consistent with its legal
obligations and the best scientific information available," use any
consensus reached as the basis of the management measure to be
submitted to the Secretary.3
While the creation of the negotiation panels under S.39's proposed
provision would be discretionary, when utilized, they would provide a
mechanism for nonuser Councils, or Councils only partly comprised of
users, to allow users meaningful and significant input, and to capture
some of the economies associated with cooperative management. Once
the panels are convened, and consensus is reached, the decisions reached
by the users would have to be utilized to the "maximum extent
practicable," given the duties of the Councils under the MFCMA. Such
248. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(3)(A) (1994).
249. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(3)(A) (1994).
250. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(4) (1994).
251. S. 39, supra note 234, § 110(f).
252. Id.
253. Id.
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user input will likely lead to more appropriate conservation measurese
and would give the individuals affected a mechanism to participate in the
development of those measures. 5 Such a mechanism is needed in those
cases where the inclusion of nonusers on the Councils would serve to
decrease the credibility of Council-made management choices rather than
to increase it.
Even assuming that the inclusion of nonusers on the Councils would,
in some cases, help to restore their legitimacy, the amendment now
proposed to achieve that end will likely fail. While the Secretary would
be required, by the proposed provision, to strive to include nonuser
members on the Councils, the Secretary would still be limited to
choosing Council members from lists of candidates selected by the
Governor of each relevant state. 6  These lists might be comprised
solely, or mostly, of users. This would be possible under the amended
act because H.R. 39 would not require Governors to nominate nonusers
for Council positions. It is also probable, given that the Governors
would still be required to consult with commercial and recreational
fishing interests when creating the list of nominees.'
The Secretary, in the above situation, would be able to do little when
faced with a list of nominees consisting solely of users. The Secretary
could review the qualifications of the individuals on the list, ensuring that
they were, "by reason of their occupational or other experience,
scientific expertise, or training," knowledgeable about the relevant
fishery resourcesY 8 However, the Secretary would not have the power,
given the changes now contained in H.R. 39, to reject the list because of
the absence of a "fair and balanced apportionment" among users and
nonusers. In turn, a court challenge based on the proposed provision
would likely fail in such a case on the basis that it was not "practicable"
for the Secretary to include such members on the Council under the
circumstances. Therefore, without a provision requiring Governors to
nominate nonusers for Council membership, any provision requiring the
Secretary to appoint such individuals may be largely ineffective.
254. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
256. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(C) (1994).
257. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(C) (1994).
258. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(C) (1994) (the Secretary may review the list to
ensure thatthe nominees meetthe requirements of § 1852(b)(2)(A)); H.R. 39, supranote
333, § 8 (amends §1852(b)(2)(B) to define "fair and balanced apportionment" as
including environmental/academic members).
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2. Recusal and Secretarial Authority
Besides altering the Secretary's directive regarding apportionment of
seats on the Councils, H.R. 39 also revises the disclosure requirements
of the MFCMA and contains recusal provisions. The Senate bill contains
similar provisions. Under the proposed schemes, "affected individuals"
would still be able to exempt themselves from 18 U.S.C. § 208 by
disclosing their financial interests according to the requirements of the
MFCMA.2 9 However, both bills narrow the definition of "affected
individual" to exclude the Executive Directors of the Councils, placing
them back within the reach of the federal criminal conflict statute
regardless of disclosure.2"
Furthermore, those Council members still qualifying as "affected
individuals" would face a recusal requirement under both the House and
Senate schemes. The House bill directs the Secretary and the Councils
to create rules prohibiting an individual from voting on any matter in
which that individual has "an interest that would be significantly
affected."261 Such an interest is defined as "a personal financial interest
that would be augmented by voting on the matter and which would only
be shared by a minority of other persons within the same industry sector
or gear group whose activity would be directly affected by a Council's
action."262 The "interest" requiring recusal under the Senate amend-
ments is substantially the same.2"
Under H.R. 39, a voting member will be required to recuse himself
or herself from voting if voting would violate the recusal rules or if the
General Counsel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion or a designee determines that voting would violate those rules.2"
Such a determination must be made at the request of any voting member
of the relevant Council.265  The Senate scheme also provides for a
conflict determination by an independent party. Instead of NOAA's
259. See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
260. H.R. 39, supra note 233, at § 8(i); S. 39, supra note 234, at § 110(g).
261. H.R. 39, supra note 233, at § 8(i).
262. Id.
263. Under S. 39, an affected individual would have to refrain from voting if a
Council decision was to directly cause "an expected and disproportionate benefit, shared
only by a minority of persons within the same industry sector or gear group," to a
financial interest of the individual. S. 39, supra note 234, § 110(g).
264. H.R. 39, supra note 233, at § 8(i).
265. Id.
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General Counsel, S. 39 allows for the decision to be made by a
"'designated official'. . . with expertise in Federal conflict-of-interest
requirements." The affected individual or the "designated :official" may
commence this determination.2' However, S. 39 also explicitly allows
a recused individual to participate in Council deliberations relating to the
vote after full disclosure, including disclosure of how the member would
have voted.' Therefore, while the recused individual may not vote, he
or she may still potentially affect the outcome of the vote.
Under H.R. 39, those "affected individuals" who knowingly fail to
disclose a financial interest or who fail to abide by the recusal rules are
subject to the civil penalties set out in 16 U.S.C. § 1857.21 The
Secretary would also be required by H.R. 39 to remove such
individuals.' S. 39 does not impose a civil penalty or removal mandate
for either failure to disclose or failure to comply with the recusal
requirements. However, those affected individuals who fail to disclose
in accordance with the act would lose their exemption from 18 U.S.C.
§ 208 under both schemes and thus, be subject to criminal penalties.Y0
In addition, under current law, while removal from the Council is not
mandatory when the conflict rules are violated, as it is in H.R. 39, it is
permitted when recommended by two-thirds of the Council in question.Y
Presumably, the Secretary would still have the discretion to remove
violators of the disclosure/ recusal rules in these circumstances under S.
39.
The recusal provisions delineated in the existing bills would probably
not have prevented the votes in controversy in the North Pacific.
Because the allocations in question in the North Pacific affected a large
class of boat owners and had no "direct and predictable effect" on the
members' financial interests, 2 voting would probably not have violated
the recusal requirements of either H.R. 39 or S. 39. Due to the limited
definitions of the "interest" that prompt recusal, the recusal requirements
of both bills would only seem to affect those individuals violating the
legal standards which already exist. They, therefore, do not deal with
the gap between these standards and the public perception of the
266. S. 39, supra note 234, at § 110(g).
267. Id.
268. H.R. 39, supra note 233, § 13(b).
269. Id. at § 8(b).
270. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(k)(7) (1994).
271. 50 C.F.R. § 601.36 (1995).
272. See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
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Councils.273 Confronting this gap, however, is crucial to restoring the
credibility of the Councils in the eyes of a public that sees the existing
standards as inadequate and whose faith is necessary if the Council
scheme is to achieve any of the benefits from cooperative management.
While the new recusal provisions alone seem inadequate to
sufficiently check the Councils, the Senate bill contains a solution with
greater potential. S. 39 would redraw the line between the policy-
making role of the Councils and the law-making role of the Secretary of
Commerce. It fully amends § 1854, dealing with FMP review and
implementation.274 It simplifies the review procedure, eliminating the
preliminary Secretarial evaluation required by the 1986 amendments to
this section.275 It then proceeds to set out a review procedure which
would eliminate the presumptive validity of Council-made FMPs in the
absence of prompt Secretarial action. In other words, S. 39 includes no
language in § 1854 which mandates that a proposed FMP or amendment
"shall go into effect" if the Secretary fails to act within the prescribed
time period.276 In addition, each FMP need not be accompanied by
Council-created regulations. Under S. 39, Councils would be allowed,
but not required, to submit regulations with each FMP.2 7 It is also
explicitly reemphasized in S. 39 that the Secretary has "general
responsibility to carry out" the provisions of the MFCMA.27
These provisions would place the Secretary squarely back into the
law-making role in the FMP process, responsible for reviewing the plans
and implementing them through the creation of regulations. The
Councils, as originally intended, would theoretically resume their
advisory role. Therefore, whether or not interested individuals vote to
further their personal interests or participate in the discussion surround-
ing such a vote, any Council decision which is not in keeping with the
National Standards can be rejected by the Secretary and will not have a
chance to presumptively take effect. Thus, S. 39 would rebalance
public/private control over fishery management under the MFCMA.
273. Prepared Testimony of Rolland A. Schmitten, Assistant Administrator for
Fisheries, NMFS, Before the House Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans,
104th Cong. (February 23, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curws File
(definition of interest requiring recusal too narrow).
274. S. 39, supra note 234, § 112.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. S. 39, supra note 234, § 111(c).
278. S. 39, supra note 234, § 112.
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Such a change would be an important first step in rebuilding the integrity
of the Council system in the eyes of the users and the public in general.
3. Council Procedure
Both H.R. 39 and S. 39 also seek to strengthen public access to the
Council process by revising Council procedures. The House bill makes
the procedural guidelines set out in § 1852 of the MFCMA, modeled
after the procedures applicable under FACA,279 mandatory.' It also
amends the public notice requirement to require that notice of meetings
be given in time to allow for meaningful public participation."' S. 39
would permit interested persons to propose to modify the agenda of
Council meetings.' Both bills require interested persons submitting
written or oral statements to the Councils to include a description of their
backgrounds and interests in the subject of the testimony.' Both bills
also increase the responsibility of the Councils to keep accurate minutes
of all meetings.' Insofar as these provisions seek to aid public scrutiny
of the Councils, they take important steps toward repairing their
integrity.
V. CONCLUSION
The Regional Fishery Management Council system is a unique
management system with the potential to govern the nation's fishery
resources, to overcome the economic incentives created by the nature of
the common good being managed, and to realize the economies of the
cooperative management of that resource. Originally designed to
balance public and private power, the Regional Council system has
evolved to a point where various checks on the private actors involved
in the system have eroded, causing many in the public sphere to call for
279. See supra notes 141-153 and accompanying text.
280. H.R. 39, supra note 233, at § 8(h).
281. Id.
282. S. 39, supra note 234, at § 110.
283. H.R. 39, supra note 233, at § 8(h); S. 39, supra note 234, at § 110.
284. H.R. 39, supra note 233, § 8(h); S. 39, supra note 234, § 110. In addition,
under both bills, these minutes are to be made available to "any court of competent
jurisdiction." While Council decisions are not reviewable under the MFCMA, this
provision may aid a court challenge to Secretarial action on an FMP or PMP
amendment.
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reform.
For those checks to be reestablished, real power must be shifted
away from the Councils. Recusal of those with direct, personal financial
interests alone is not enough. The user-comprised Councils themselves
must face increased scrutiny. A rebalance of power between the
Secretary and the Councils is one way to accomplish this. Another
would be to alter the membership of the Councils to include nonusers,
while providing users with another mechanism through which to affect
the process.
As the debate over the MFCMA reveals, the correct balance of
power, where users do not feel coerced by the management system but
where government is still present to check user behavior which is not in
the best interest of the resource, is not obvious. Congress must strive to
create such a balance if user participation in the management system is
to achieve its potential. Although getting the institutions needed for
cooperative management "right" is a difficult, time-consuming and
conflict-invoking process, the survival of the U.S. fishing industry is
well worth the effort needed to strike the correct balance.
